

## People's Republic of China – Threat Actors, Contact with Candidates and Staff, and Funding of Threat Actors

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*The Commission has been provided with all relevant intelligence and assessments, which indicates information on reliability and corroboration of the information contained therein.*

## SUMMARY

1. Prior to and during the 43<sup>rd</sup> General Election of Canada in 2019 (GE43), a group of known and suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-related threat actors in Canada, including PRC officials, worked in loose coordination with one another to covertly advance PRC interests through Canadian democratic institutions.
2. Reporting indicated that 11 political candidates and 13 political staff members were assessed to be either implicated<sup>1</sup> in or impacted<sup>2</sup> by, this group of threat actors. Seven candidates were from the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) and four were from the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). Some of these individuals appeared willing to cooperate in FI-related activity while others appeared to be unaware of potential FI-related activity due to its clandestine nature.
3. In one example, intelligence reports indicate that officials from the PRC met with political staffers and specifically conveyed their expectation that the staffers screen their candidate's attendance at certain events, such as those hosted by Taiwanese officials. Political staffers are important points of contact because they are a part of the information flow process to elected officials and often influence the schedule of events that a candidate attends.
4. Intelligence reports also indicate that some of these threat actors also directed certain Chinese language media outlets to support specific candidates.
5. Additionally, intelligence assessments suggest that some of these threat actors received financial support from the PRC. For example, there likely were at least two transfer of funds approximating \$250,000 from PRC officials in Canada, possibly for FI-related purposes, though most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates. These were transferred via multiple individuals to obfuscate their origins: via an influential community leader, to the staff member of a 2019 Federal Election candidate, and then to an Ontario MPP. The transfer(s) reportedly took place in late 2018 – early 2019.

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<sup>1</sup> Implicated – For the purpose of this summary, implicated indicates that an individual has at least one direct connection to a person of interest regarding PRC FI activities. This does not mean an implicated individual is knowingly involved in threat activity or is complicit in threat activity.

<sup>2</sup> Impacted – For the purpose of this summary, impacted indicates that an individual was directly affected by FI activities conducted by the threat actors.