

## Comments by Individual People's Republic of China Officials on Expressed Partisan Preferences in the 2019 and 2021 General Election

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*The Commission has been provided with all relevant intelligence and assessments, which indicates information on reliability and corroboration of the information contained therein.*

## SUMMARY

1. Foreign Interference (FI) activities by the People's Republic of China (PRC) are generally thought to be party-agnostic, tending to focus on ensuring that pro-China narratives are strengthened in Canada. In the time periods relevant to the work of the Commission for the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, the following reporting occurred:
2. In the course of the 43<sup>rd</sup> and 44<sup>th</sup> General Elections of Canada, there was intelligence reporting that a small number of PRC officials in Canada made comments expressing a preference for certain specific electoral outcomes. Such a preference would not constitute FI, nor would it necessarily indicate a coordinated plan. However, it does provide context about other FI activities.
3. In 2019, there was reporting that PRC officials in Canada expressed political preferences, which were party agnostic and opportunistic at a riding level; more broadly, they vacillated based on the ongoing PRC-related positions of the different political parties during the political campaign. Expressing such preferences does not constitute FI, nor would it necessarily indicate a coordinated plan. However, it does provide context about other FI activities.
4. In 2021, there was reporting that some individual PRC officials in Canada made comments expressing a preference for a Liberal Party minority government. The PRC officials' expressed rationale included that they did not perceive any of the political parties as being particularly 'pro-China', but rather that they perceived minority governments as being more limited in terms of enacting 'anti-China' policies.
5. Additional reporting indicated that efforts were also being made to build relationships with other political parties. Such preferences do not constitute FI, nor would it necessarily indicate a coordinated plan. However, it does provide context about other FI activities.