

## Further Han Dong Intelligence

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*This is a summary of some intelligence information that is available to the Government of Canada's national security and intelligence community on a certain topic, presented such that it can be released to the public without disclosing information that would cause injury to national security and international relations. As such it has several important limitations. **The summary must be read in light of these limitations, otherwise the summary has the potential to mislead the reader**. The limitations are the following:*

- **Summary may be incomplete:** *The summary summarizes some, but not necessarily all, the intelligence information on this topic that is available to the Government of Canada's national security and intelligence community. For example, it only contains relevant information that can be appropriately sanitized for public release.*
- **Summary does not indicate time of collection:** *This summary does not indicate, unless expressly stated, when the summarized information was collected or obtained. This information was collected and analyzed over a period of time, which may/may not have been available to decision makers across the Government of Canada during the writ-period. As such, for example, it should not be assumed that the information was collected close in time to the events being described.*
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- **Summary does not indicate corroboration or lack of corroboration:** *The summary does not indicate whether other information exists that may corroborate the summarized information, or, alternatively, whether there is no such corroborating information.*
- **Summary does not analyze information:** *This document is a summary of intelligence; it is not an analysis of the overall import, meaning, or strength of intelligence.*

*The Commission has been provided with all relevant intelligence and assessments, which indicates information on reliability and corroboration of the information contained therein.*

**Further Han Dong Intelligence:** *PM/PMO knowledge/information flow respecting additional intelligence relating to Han Dong after his nomination, including advice provided respecting Mr. Dong's potential return to the Liberal Caucus; and PM/PMO knowledge/information flow respecting any follow up on intelligence/investigation into Mr. Dong nomination issue.*

1. Should additional intelligence investigations respecting or implicating the 2019 Don Valley North Liberal Party nomination process exist, it could not be disclosed publicly as it would be injurious to national security, potentially revealing information on intelligence operations, sources, targets, partners, methods and/or intelligence gaps.
2. As with all investigations, should additional intelligence or analysis exist on this matter, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as per established protocols, would disseminate it to Government of Canada clients and respond to requests for additional information or analysis.
3. Publicly released intelligence concerning Mr. Han Dong can be found in the summary "Intelligence relating to Han Dong and communication with People's Republic of China officials regarding the "Two Michaels"" (CAN.SUM.000002).
4. Intelligence reporting concerning potential irregularities in the 2019 Don Valley North Liberal Party nomination process has been disseminated by CSIS to Government of Canada client departments and partners, such as the Privy Council Office, Public Safety Canada, Global Affairs Canada, the Communications Security Establishment, Elections Canada, and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections. The intelligence was also disseminated to the Security Intelligence Threats to Election Task Force (SITE TF) and briefed to security cleared Liberal Party of Canada members in September 2019, as well as provided to the Panel of Five through regular SITE TF updates during the 2019 general election.
5. Following the 2019 election, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) requested a briefing about the reported irregularities in the Don Valley North nomination contest, which senior officials delivered soon after. Since then, the Prime Minister and PMO have received additional briefings from officials about Mr. Dong.
6. Mr. Dong would be vetted for potential parliamentary appointments in the same manner as all other candidates being considered for such roles.
7. After the media stories based on allegedly leaked national security information identified Mr. Dong as being potentially tied to the PRC, Mr. Dong stepped aside from the Liberal caucus while seeking to clear his name.