

For Public Release

Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien de renseignements de sécurité

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## How the PRC Successfully Targeted [REDACTED]

**KEY ASSESSMENTS**

- PRC officials in Canada seek to interfere in elections at all levels. They often conduct election-related foreign interference through local networks: [REDACTED]
- Co-opted community leaders reportedly provide material and financial support [REDACTED] to acquire [REDACTED] and the United Front Work Department (UFWED). [REDACTED]
- Free trips to attend Chinese celebrations in Beijing, which includes access to exclusive business opportunities. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] channeling donations and other assistance to preferred candidates will foster a bond of obligation to the PRC that will, when a preferred candidate is elected into office, pay dividends for the promotion of CCP interests.

**Timeline:**

- 2018:** [REDACTED]
- 2019:** [REDACTED]
- 2020:** [REDACTED]
- 2021:** [REDACTED]
- 2022:** [REDACTED]

**Timeline Details:**

- 2018:** OCTOBER 16, 2018: The Toronto Star reported a leaked WeChat message indicating that a local group planned efforts to "get out the vote" for the 2019 Federal Election by paying a "travel subsidy,"—resulting in negative perceptions of Chinese-Canadians. [REDACTED]
- 2019:** [REDACTED]
- 2020:** EARLY 2020: [REDACTED]
- 2021:** APRIL 2021: [REDACTED]
- 2022:** JANUARY 2022: [REDACTED]  
 SPRING & SUMMER 2022: Community associations, their leaders, and associated individuals organize fundraisers [REDACTED]  
 JULY 2022: [REDACTED]

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