

For Public Release



**CSIS National
Security Brief**

**Rapport du SCRS ^{sur}
les
enjeux de sécurité nationale**

● CNSB 23/19
● OCTOBER 1, 2019

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This document is for the information of the NSIA, Director of Operations of the Privy Council, Assistant Secretary of Security and Intelligence of the Privy Council, the Clerk of the Privy Council, Deputy Clerk of Privy Council, Deputy Minister of GAC, Assistant Deputy Minister International Security of GAC, Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Associate Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Deputy Minister of Justice, Associate Deputy Minister of Justice, Chief of the Communications Security Establishment, Deputy Chief of the Communications Security Establishment, and SITE PALS Gallit Dobner (GAC), Eric Gordon (RCMP), [REDACTED] (RCMP), and Lyall King (CSE). The information and intelligence contained herein must not be disclosed, used as part of an investigation or used as evidence without prior consultation with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Foreign Interference in the 2019 Federal Campaign of Dong Han

[REDACTED] it was alleged that the PRC interfered in the Don Valley North Liberal nomination of 2019 09 12, remain unsubstantiated. [REDACTED] the allegations are consistent with our current understanding of PRC foreign interference activity in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PRC interference in the GTA likely relies on a densely connected network of PRC-linked individuals working to advance PRC interests through Canadian democratic institutions by overt and covert means. This interference network is centred on four professional communities: political candidates, party staffers (including campaign officials), local Chinese-Canadian community members, and [REDACTED] *PRC Officials*. Individuals leverage their overt positions within their respective communities in loose coordination with one another to clandestinely advance a PRC agenda in Canada's democratic institutions.

[REDACTED]

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Anticipated Interference?

The redacted text references campaign efforts of Han Dong to register new Liberal Party members, including international students, to vote in the nomination race.



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