

GE44: Lessons Learned

1. RRM Canada monitoring reflects pre-election threat assessment, namely that any foreign state affiliated disinformation will likely [REDACTED]
2. While SITE has once again played an indispensable role in coordinating threat analysis based on the unique mandates of SITE members, an all-source (fused) analysis would better meet the challenges of the contemporary FI space described above and would facilitate a whole-of-government response, including communications.
3. The situation above (coordinated but not fused SITE approach) also left RRM Canada "with nowhere to go" with its open source threat assessment as SITE/CSIS in particular did not align with RRM Canada's sense of urgency in briefing up/shining light. This was a repeat of GE43.
4. The role of EC's threat monitoring function needs to be clarified, better framed in existing information sharing practices (thresholds), and squared with that of SITE.
5. Proactive public communication on threats continues to be a challenge. When potential information operation was flagged by RRM Canada, discussed by a think tank, and raised in mainstream media, GoC was completely silent as Protocol threshold was not met. This left an impression that GoC is not aware and not doing enough.
6. Support/funding for civil society – a key part of building societal resilience -- was not in place, leaving RRM Canada scrambling to contract at the last hour.
7. To support P5 and USS better – need debriefs from and/or take part in P5 meetings.