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1. Regarding the Globe reports, how many times and when were you briefed on Chinese interference in the 2019 and 2022 elections?
 - In June 2021, CSIS released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic Process to better inform Canadians of this serious threat. As this report shows, foreign states target our democratic process to covertly influence Canadian public policy, public opinion and ultimately undermine our democracy.
 - As Lyall King, from CSE, stated during his appearance before this Committee, "when it comes to threats to democratic processes—and it's no surprise, as we've mentioned this before—China and Russia tend to be the two big players in that space. They do represent different threats to us because they behave in different ways, because of their different interests, intent and capabilities."
 - That being said, both in 2019 and 2021, the Panel determined that the Government of Canada did not detect foreign interference that threatened Canada's ability to have a free and fair election or that warranted public communication.

2. Are you aware if other Ministers were also briefed on this information?
 - **DCL believes this question should be deferred to the political level.**

3. What did Canada's national security and intelligence apparatus inform you at these briefings?
 - Canada's security and intelligence agencies are aware of and remain vigilant to these activities. They use a wide array of measures on an ongoing basis to detect and counter foreign interference activities. As a member of Cabinet, and the Minister responsible for foreign affairs, I regularly receive briefings on issues related to national security and intelligence, which includes the issue of foreign interference.
 - During electoral periods, as you have heard, the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, and the Panel of its members, was created ahead of the 2019 general election, and is in place to counter the threat of foreign interference as part of the Plan to Protect Canada's Democracy.
 - The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE) briefs the Panel on the threat environment. Each member of SITE (CSE, CSIS, RCMP and GAC) provides information collected based on their respective mandates. These threat briefings provide the Panel with insights into known interference activities in Canada by foreign actors, particularly with a focus on election interference.
 - As my colleagues have stated, let me be clear: both in 2019 and 2021, the Panel determined that the Government of Canada did not detect foreign interference that threatened Canada's ability to have a free and fair election.

4. Who are the 11 candidates?
 - I am aware of the allegations as reported by the media. As you have heard from other witness testimony at this Committee, the intelligence community works hard to detect and understand attempts by foreign governments to interfere in Canadian elections.

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- I cannot confirm nor deny any specific or current investigation into the allegations, nor can I provide insight into classified information. To do so would put the security and intelligence community's important work to address foreign interference at risk.
 - I will note that the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, appearing before the Defence Committee last week, repeated that there had been no evidence of a threat to the integrity of the elections in either 2019 or 2021, and rejected allegations of Chinese attempts to interfere in the 2019 election by funding 11 candidates.
5. Was the Prime Minister briefed about electoral interference by Beijing last January, specifically in respect of the 11 candidates?
- While the Prime Minister is provided with briefings on intelligence matters on a regular basis, I cannot speak to the alleged briefings as reported by the media. While my role is to advise on foreign policy issues in this context, I would not have been responsible for providing any intelligence briefings to the Prime Minister in this regard, nor am I aware of any briefing in January on the topic.
6. Why weren't MPs apprised of foreign interference in their election ridings?
- I am not in a position to discuss publicly the Panel's deliberations, including specific incidents. However, I can say that the Panel is mandated to consider the degree to which any particular incident could undermine Canadians' ability to have a free and fair election. The Panel did not make a public announcement during the 2019 and 2021 elections, meaning that we haven't seen incidents that met that threshold.
 - Informing individuals is **not** something that the Panel is mandated to do regardless of what information we received or did not receive during the 2021 election. However, the Cabinet Directive notes that SITE members, may consider all options to effectively address the interference. I understand security agencies do not comment publicly on their investigative activities as a general practice. I would defer to them on whether or not they would inform the affected party in such cases.
7. What diplomatic actions have you taken on Chinese interference?
- Canada is deeply concerned that some states are employing disinformation, as one of a number of tactics, to erode democracy and the rules based international system, which is why we are pleased to lead the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism on an ongoing basis to enhance collaboration to identify and respond to foreign threats to democracy, like disinformation.
 - We publicly named the PRC as a country that uses disinformation to achieve their strategic objectives in our first joint G7 RRM Annual Report.
 - Before the drop of the writ, as part of regular practice, GAC notifies all foreign missions in Canada to respect the election period, and withhold views that affect bilateral relation, as a reminder of obligations under the Vienna Convention.
 - Increasingly, GAC uses cyber diplomacy to improve global security by facilitating information sharing, exchanging best practices, and working with allies and partners to deter and respond to malicious cyber activities.

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- This includes a new Cyber Diplomacy and Security Initiative, a part of the recently-announced Indo-Pacific Strategy, which will increase the strength of our relationships in defence and law enforcement in the region.
8. During a recent CACN appearance, officials said that the Chinese Ambassador was summoned three times. What was discussed during those meetings and what was the Ambassador's response?
- GAC formally requested detailed information regarding these stations, and asked that the PRC end any activities that fall outside of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
 - GAC also warned of consequences if the PRC fails to address this issue, and made it clear that the Embassy is responsible for the actions of any sub-national or local jurisdictions in Canada.
9. Is Canada considering sanctioning any Chinese officials for their involvement?
- Not at this time, as an investigation is still underway. That hasn't prevented us from taking immediate and meaningful action, including in the diplomatic lane.
 - The issue of Chinese overseas police stations has been raised by Global Affairs Canada with the Chinese embassy on seven occasions – this includes summoning the Chinese Ambassador twice – and by our Ambassador to China, who raised it with the Chinese MFA on two occasions.
 - GAC has warned the Chinese embassy of severe consequences if the PRC fails to address the issue of "overseas police stations," and made it clear that the Embassy is responsible not just for the action of Chinese central authorities, but for the actions of any Chinese sub-national or local jurisdictions operating in Canada.
 - The Chinese embassy has indicated that the overseas police stations have been shut down, but the RCMP will continue to closely monitor and investigate the situation.
 - More generally, Canada has raised with China its concerns regarding Chinese foreign interference in our democratic systems and civil society repeatedly, and at the highest levels.
 - The RCMP have also launched an investigation, appealed to the public for additional information, and provided a hotline, so an investigative track is underway.
 - On this, and the broader issue of foreign interference, we continue to support Public Safety as it develops and delivers new tools to counter interference.
 - Canada is judicious in its approach to imposing sanctions, both against individuals and against states, and is committed to their effective and coordinated use when appropriate.
 - We also consider the broader political and international contexts when deciding whether sanctions or any other tools in Canada's foreign policy toolbox may be an appropriate response.
 - As investigations are still ongoing, I will not comment further.
10. The NSICOP released a report stating that "The internal governance of the Department's national security and intelligence activities is inconsistent, and in some areas completely absent. For its international security programs, the Department has strong governance mechanisms, including detailed policies, procedures and oversight committee structures. For its most sensitive intelligence activities, the opposite is true: the Department lacks policies, procedures or guidance documents,

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including for its role in requesting the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada [redacted] or providing foreign policy risk assessments for CSIS and CSE activities." What is the department doing to address this issue?

- The findings and recommendations presented NSICOP's report are important guides in the further development of the Department's governance and accountability framework.
- The Department has been working diligently in recent years to augment further its internal governance and standardize its processes. This work continues.
- I issued specific directives to my officials in 2022 that articulates and governs the Department's intelligence activities and provides clear accountability expectations.
- My officials will continue to work with partners such as CSIS, CSE and DND to further strengthen governance and accountability mechanisms across the range of Canada's security and intelligence activities.

11. The same report also states that "The absence of governance for the Department's most sensitive intelligence activities creates an important gap in ministerial accountability. The Department has no requirements to report regularly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the full spectrum of its national security and intelligence activities. This gap raises concerns about the Minister's awareness of the risk associated with the Department's most sensitive activities on an ongoing basis, and undermines the Minister's accountability for those activities." What is the department doing to address this issue?

- The findings and recommendations presented NSICOP's report are important guides in the further development of the Department's governance and accountability framework.
- The Department has been working diligently in recent years to augment further its internal governance and standardize its processes. This work continues.
- While it is true that there were no formal requirements for the department to report regularly to my office, the fact is officials have briefed regularly on the department's national security and intelligence activities.
- Nevertheless, when issuing my directives in 2022, I requested regular reporting to my office on the Department's security and intelligence programs and outlined my accountability expectations.

12. Do you accept the report's recommendations?

- As I stated in a written response to the NSICOP Chair, I welcome and agree with all of the Committee's recommendations. I have instructed my officials to start implementing all recommendations and provide me with frequent updates.

13. GAC also has a history procuring Chinese technology that threatens Canada's national security. What reassurance can you provide that you do not have any contracts with firms associated with the Chinese government?

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We have taken the June 2021 recommendations from OGGO seriously. GAC along with a number of other departments are working with PSPC and TBS, as the policy lead, to address these recommendations and monitor progress, including establishing strategies to avoid contracting with vendors associated with the Chinese government. Over the last two years GAC had concurrently accomplished the following that greatly reduce our risks of having contracts with Chinese state-owned vendors:

- There are a number of check points in the procurement process to ensure that we are dealing with suppliers that respect our Canadian values.
- In addition, we have put in place a number of additional measures to enhance the information that is used at various stages of the process and manage risk when dealing with outside suppliers.
 - One example is greater collaboration with our internal security partners – both within the department (*Consular, Security and Emergency Management Branch and International Security Branch*) as well as across government (with Communications Security Establishment) to identify and address areas of potential risk early – through, for example, supply chain integrity assessments and vendor checks.
 - In addition to this, for certain commodities, National Security Exemptions (NSE) are being established in order to allow Canada to not consider bids from vendors from countries we have trade agreements when there is a potential security risk. We currently have NSEs for armoured vehicles, detection equipment such as x-ray machines, and will soon have one for electronic security equipment.

14. Which departments across Government have contracts with Sinclair and does Global Affairs Canada have any contracts with this company? If so, what is this contract for and are you willing to cancel the contract?

- We do not have the info for other Departments. At GAC, our system shows that we have a single contract with Sinclair in the last five (5) years. In November of 2021, a contract for \$12 800 was awarded to Sinclair for 5 sets of antenna-duplexer used in a long range walkie-talkie system. The equipment ordered was delivered and the contract was fulfilled.
- This equipment is intended to be installed outside of our office space and is for unclassified logistical activities and as a fall back option for emergency management. Out of the 5 sets of radio purchased, 4 are still in storage and will not be deployed to be installed. The remaining set is currently in used at our Mission in San Salvador and we are providing instruction to replace the equipment. There is no plan to procure any additional equipment from Sinclair.

15. Given the numerous flags from our national security and intelligence agencies, why were these contracts with Sinclair signed in the first place?

- Since the equipment procured is intended to be used for unclassified logistical activities, no security concerns were flagged and the procurement took place.

16. How will the government's Indo-Pacific Strategy address foreign interference in the future?

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- Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) includes new resources to devote more attention to threats in, and emanating from the Indo-Pacific region.
- Some of these targeted new investments to bolster Canadian security and intelligence capacities will monitor, address and counter foreign interference.
- Increasingly, GAC uses cyber diplomacy to improve global security by facilitating information sharing, exchanging best practices, and working with allies and partners to deter and respond to malicious cyber activities.
- The IPS also includes a new Cybersecurity and Cyber Governance Initiative which will increase the strength of our relationships in defence and law enforcement in the region and increase collective security by facilitating information sharing, exchanging best practices, and exploring options for collaboration.

17. Chinese police stations in Canada are unacceptable – why has the government been so indifferent to this clear violation of the Vienna Convention?

- GAC has demarched the PRC Ambassador to Canada on three occasions regarding Chinese "overseas police stations" in Canada.
- In these representations, GAC formally requested detailed information regarding these stations, and asked that the PRC end any activities that fall outside of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
- GAC made it clear that the Embassy is responsible for the actions of any sub-national or local jurisdictions in Canada, and that anything beyond what VCDR or VCCR permit is unacceptable.
- GAC also conveyed immediate consequences and warned of the possibility of further consequences if the PRC fails to address this issue.
- GAC also engaged like-minded countries named in the Safeguard Defenders report to share information on this issue.
- The issue of Chinese violations of Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations has been discussed at the G7, and will continue to be on the agenda of the G7 and other forums.

18. How many of these police stations are in Canada?

- This question is best directed to other agencies.
- GAC is part of a whole-of-government response to this issue, including the departments and agencies making up the Public Safety portfolio. The RCMP have also launched an investigation into these stations.
- Global Affairs Canada has made multiple formal representations to China's Ambassador to Canada regarding Chinese "police stations" in Canada, and is considering further steps.
- The Chinese embassy has communicated to GAC that the Chinese "police stations" have been shut down.
- We will take a "verify, then trust" approach, given the nature of the matter and our broader concern with foreign interference.

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19. Elections are won riding by riding. What is the process identified by the panel to respond to interference in an election system where a handful of ridings can determine who becomes Prime Minister?
- Each election is different, and one of the considerations for the Panel is the ability of the incident or incidents that threatens Canada's ability to have a free and fair election. My colleague, Minister LeBlanc may want to add more information since the Protecting Democracy Plan falls under his mandate.
 - Following the 2019 federal election, an independent evaluation of the Protocol was conducted by Jim Judd, a former Canadian public servant and director of CSIS who previously appeared before this Committee. He recommended in his evaluation that the threshold for an announcement remain unchanged. The high threshold helps to avoid the Panel becoming a frequent intervener in any general election.
20. What is the government doing to address the national intelligence law that was passed by the PRC, which requires Chinese organization anywhere in the world to assist with the state's intelligence work?
- On this, and the broader issue of foreign interference, we continue to support Public Safety as it develops and delivers new tools to counter interference.
 - In our demarches with the PRC Embassy we have already explicitly raised, and will continue to call out and reject, extra-territorial application of Chinese law or party policies.
21. Minister, have you directly communicated with your Chinese counterpart that foreign interference in Canada is unacceptable?
- I have raised the issue of Chinese foreign interference directly with my Chinese counterpart at the G20 Summit in Bali.
 - More generally, Canada has raised with China its concerns regarding Chinese foreign interference in our democratic systems and civil society repeatedly, and at the highest levels.
 - **OPB believes that further input for this question should be deferred to the political level.**
22. How does the government interpret former Ambassador John McCallum's intervention on behalf of Meng Wanzhou having "quite good arguments on her side?"
- **DCL believes this question should be deferred to the political level.**
23. It's important that Canadians learn the full extent of China's interference in our elections and institutions. Will you disclose the documents on the firing of the two Winnipeg infectious disease scientists?
- **OPB believes this question should be deferred to RCMP/PHAC.**