

For Public Release

2022 03 XX

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OBJECT / SUJET: Meeting between CSIS and the OCCE**FILE No / No DOSSIER:** XXXXX**DATE & PLACE OF CONTACT / DATE ET ENDROIT DU CONTACT:**

2021 11 02 – CSIS HQ

OCCE EMPLOYEE(S) ATTENDING / EMPLOYÉ(S) DE LA GRC PRÉSENT

[REDACTED]
 Louise PANNETON
 Al MATHEWS
 Mylene GIGOU

SERVICE EMPLOYEE(S) ATTENDING / EMPLOYÉ(S) DU SERVICE PRÉSENT:

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] IAB
 [REDACTED] CICP
 [REDACTED] LDB

PURPOSE OF THE CONTACT / OBJET DES CONTACTS:

To introduce Service desks and OCCE desks and discuss lessons learned

TOPICS DISCUSSED / SUJETS DE DISCUSSION:

The Service opened with an introduction of the primary desks responsible for elections interference. A review of the SITE task force ensued. SITE is comprised of CSIS/CSE/RCMP/GAC and was created before the 2019 election after seeing the effects of the 2016 US election. After the Capitol Hill riots in 2021 01, IMVE concerns emerged on top of state actors. The two main state actors most involved in the last election were China and India.

The Service noted that there was a clear point of engagement in the S&I community with SITE, that it would provide guidance, and promote the use of intelligence to manage and mitigate threats.

Foreign Interference was defined and the Service noted that overt diplomatic efforts are all permissible, but once activity moves from overt to covert that changes everything. A placemat had been prepared to help situate the overt/covert explanation. Furthermore, an After Action Review (AAR) was being prepared from SITE that would provide additional clarity.

Some key judgements were discussed: Canada's electoral processes and systems continue to be resilient. Over the write period, SITE saw no indication of foreign manipulation. However, there may have been efforts from the CCP to dissuade the Chinese diaspora from voting for the Conservatives. Foreign Interference targeted certain ridings [REDACTED] with a focus on individuals who support a pro-PRC agenda.

Other state actors – Russia, KSA, Iran, and Pakistan – had minimal contact with the election.

India, however, did put effort into individual campaigns. IMVE had some grievances regarding COVID with an increase noted in violent rhetoric, [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] Anti-Maskers and Anti-Vaxxers vocalised personal grievances against the government.

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
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The SITE report will be given to the Panel of 5 ADMs in GAC, Public Safety, NSIA, DOJ and the Clerk.

The overall result is that the integrity of election 44 was not compromised. However, how do we use communications as a tool to counter the FI threat in the future will be the question that is asked of the Panel.

A breakdown of what different groups look at ensued:



IMVE: Democratic threats to Institutions and a notable increase in violent rhetoric, more threats to key persons, especially the Prime Minister. [redacted] However, there were no main groups or formal protests detected and no major threats reporting during Election Day.

The Service then discussed China. The PRC's approach is perennial, not just during election cycles. They build relationships from school boards trustees, municipal councillors, MPPs up to MPs. They also target political staffers to gain access and see schedules. Business people, academics and people in the media are also targeted [redacted] the PRC is very patient. [redacted]

During the 2019 election, the CCP was active and made attempts to mobilise the Chinese diaspora community. The CCP wants to control the narrative and have made attempts to interfere in nomination processes for political parties [redacted] Internal party processes are open to manipulation as community associations [redacted] are pushed towards specific candidates. [redacted] Businesses are also leveraged during these times. [redacted]

However, the 2021 election was very different from the 2019 one [redacted] [redacted] The PRC was very concerned with the Conservative platform piece of 'standing up to China.' [redacted]

There have been reports of PRC coercion, intimidation or threats in ridings [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

The example of what happened in British Columbia was discussed and the OCCE noted that it was looking into it as well due to the headlines and articles (free lunches in support of a particular candidate).

The OCCE noted that during the election, they had received over 1500 complaints and were digging deeper into some of these issues. The Service noted that it was there to help.

Specific OCCE topics were discussed along with [REDACTED] The Service stated that it would provide the definition of Foreign Interference to the OCCE.

DISCLOSURE / DIVULGATION:

The Service provided open source articles to the OCCE on top of this briefing.

DECISIONS / DÉCISIONS:

N/A

ACTION ITEMS / ÉLÉMENTS D'ACTION:**UPDATE / MISE À JOUR:**

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