

Recommendation Leads and Secondary Contributor Table – GR: A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada-People’s Republic of China Relationship

INSTRUCTIONS

- Departments and teams are asked to validate their role as leads or contributors on each recommendation listed below, including providing contact information.
- The lead on each recommendation will work with implicated contributors, amalgamate input from consultations, and provide finalized text to PS/NSPD.
- When submitting responses to recommendations, each contributor must clearly indicate the following:
 - Do you agree, take note of, or disagree with a recommendation;
 - Anticipated Q&As for your response;
 - Whether your Minister should receive a special invitation (if not a member) if the proposal is a main item at the Cabinet Committee on Operations

Link to report: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/CACN/report-3/>

| I) Relating to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Canada and Communication with the PRC | Lead | Contributors |
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| <p>That the Government of Canada convey, to the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Canada, that any interference with the rights and freedoms of people in Canada is unacceptable, will not be tolerated, will result in serious consequences for those responsible, and will damage the bilateral relationship between Canada and the People's Republic of China.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #1, page 25</i></p> | GAC | |
| <p>That, in light of the allegations of threats and intimidation against people in Canada, the Government of Canada continue to ensure that all accredited diplomatic personnel of the People's Republic of China continue to act within the strict confines of their official responsibilities.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #2, page 25</i></p> | GAC | PS/NCSB RCMP JUS |
| <p>That the Government of Canada make clear that attempts by the People's Republic of China to apply the National Security Law in an extraterritorial manner is unacceptable.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #4, page 25</i></p> | GAC | PS/NCSB |
| II) Domestic Legislation: Protection & Security Measures | | |
| <i>National Security Legislation Reform</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |

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| <p>That the Government of Canada undertake a comprehensive national security review that culminates in the publication of a national security policy. The review should include an assessment of the effectiveness of the current national security approach, laws, and practices that identifies areas where improvements can be made; an assessment of the role and mandate of key national security agencies; and an examination of the role played by international cooperation in Canada's national security approach and opportunities for enhanced cooperation</p> <p><i>Recommendation #34, page 82</i></p> | PS/NCSB | JUS FIN ISED CSIC RCMP |
| <i>Reporting & Investigating Intimidation</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |
| <p>That the Government of Canada work with provinces and territories to establish measures supporting individuals or groups in Canada who are the target of state-backed harassment and intimidation. The measures should include the establishment of a widely disseminated and single point of contact to which people can report incidents. The measures should also include coordination mechanisms with other orders of government to ensure that all incidents requiring investigation are addressed in a consistent and timely manner so that state-backed harassment and intimidation are effectively deterred and countered.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #3, page 25</i></p> | RCMP | PS/NCSB CSIS GAC PS/CPB JUS |
| <i>Research Security</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |

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| <p>That the Government of Canada advise provincial governments, as well as Canadian universities and research institutions, about the threats from the People’s Republic of China to national security and intellectual property. The advice should include explicit guidance against research partnerships and collaboration with universities, entities, and researchers from the People’s Republic of China in the five sensitive areas identified by CSIS (artificial intelligence, quantum technology, 5G, biopharma, clean tech). The Government of Canada should also conduct ongoing outreach and provide resources to assist universities and research institutions in developing robust mechanisms to protect national security and intellectual property, while respecting academic freedom and institutional autonomy.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #5, page 37</i></p> | PS/NCSB (NSPD) | ISED JUS CSIS PHAC DND |
| <p>That the Government of Canada, through a ministerial policy directive, ban the federal granting councils from funding research connected with universities, entities, and researchers from the PRC in the five sensitive areas identified by CSIS.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #6, page 37</i></p> | ISED | PS/NCSB CSIS JUS PHAC DND |
| <p>That the Government of Canada explore the possibility of issuing security clearances for key individuals in the non-profit sector, private sector, universities, and research institutions to allow them to receive comprehensive briefings from Canada’s security and intelligence agencies so that they can take appropriate steps to protect their intellectual property.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #7, page 37</i></p> | ISED | PS/NCSB CSIS JUS RCMP PHAC DND |

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| <p>That the Government of Canada undertake a review of its national security legislation, prioritizing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, with the objective of ensuring Canada's security and intelligence agencies can engage more effectively with universities and research institutions in furthering the protection of Canada's national security and intellectual property.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #8, page 38</i></p> | CSIS | PS/NCSB JUS ISED RCMP CSE DND |
| <p>That the Government of Canada work with provincial governments to encourage Canadian education institutions to be fully transparent about their agreements with Confucius Institutes.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #9, page 38</i></p> | ISED | PS/NCSB DND |
| <p><i>Protecting Democracy and Elections</i></p> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |

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| <p>That the Government of Canada implement the four recommendations of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians to improve the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, as listed in paragraph 14 of its 2020 Annual Report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Protocol's mandate should capture all forms of foreign interference, from cyber interference to more traditional methods; • the membership of the Protocol's Panel should be composed of non-partisan individuals, including prominent Canadians, who may carry more weight in the highly politicized context of an election; • the government should engage frequently and substantively with political parties on the Protocol's purpose and operation to ensure the widest understanding of the Panel's nonpartisan role and the process for intervention; and • further thought should be given to how the Panel would inform Canadians of an incident of foreign interference, including issues of attribution <p><i>Recommendation #10, page 43</i></p> | PCO | PS/NCSB CSIS PCH Elections Canada |
| <p>That the Government of Canada in its engagement with political parties provide information of specific application, including information about foreign interference regarding specific candidates and donors, rather than just information of a general nature, allowing political parties to take measures to counter foreign interference.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #11, page 43</i></p> | PCO | PS/NCSB CSIS PCH RCMP |
| <i>Media & Mal/Mis/Disinformation</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |

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| <p>That the Department of Canadian Heritage take measures to counter the prevalence of People's Republic of China-influenced media in Canadian diaspora communities. Such measures could include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enacting initiatives to counter misinformation and disinformation disseminated by actors associated with the Government of the People's Republic of China and targeted at Chinese diaspora communities in Canada, including the funding of projects through the Digital Citizen Initiative; • Identifying the ownership of media organizations related to the PRC in Canada and their activities in Canada, including but not limited to misinformation campaigns, censorship, and intimidation; • Exploring ways to flag and address misinformation and censorship on Chinese state-controlled social media apps such as WeChat and TikTok; and • Exploring ways to reduce/eliminate Chinese state-controlled social media's presence in Canada. <p><i>Recommendation #12, page 48</i></p> | PCH | CRTC CSIS PS/NCSB |
| <p>That the Minister of Canadian Heritage issue an order under Section 7 of the Broadcasting Act to direct the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission to a new broadcasting policy of general application that authoritarian state-controlled broadcasters not be on the List of non-Canadian programming services and stations authorized for distribution.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #13, page 49</i></p> | PCH | CRTC JUS |

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| <p>That the Government of Canada explore how it could require social media platforms operating in Canada that are connected to the People's Republic of China to disclose their practices with respect to the collection, use and transfer of user data, as well as their moderation or restriction of any user content.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #19, page 62</i></p> | JUS | PS/NCSB PCH ISED |
| <i>Countering Foreign Interference</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributor</i> |
| <p>That the Government of Canada introduce legislation to establish a foreign agents registry that would require any individual or entity, including former public office holders, to publicly declare any contracts or remuneration with a hostile state, as determined by the Government of Canada, or any entity affiliated with that hostile state.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #14, page 52</i></p> | PS/NSOD | JUS ISED FIN |
| <p>That Public Safety Canada report regularly to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security detailing the extent, targets, methods and objectives of the People's Republic of China's interference activities in Canada, and that the Government of Canada, through its national security and diplomatic architecture, take immediate steps to counteract any interference that is taking place.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #15, page 53</i></p> | PS/NSOD | CSIS RCMP FIN |

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| <p>That, as part of a whole-of-government plan to counter foreign interference, the Government of Canada establish a national counter foreign interference coordinator to oversee a comprehensive response to foreign interference. This office should work with Canada's security and intelligence agencies to develop threat assessments, coordinate outreach with communities at risk of foreign interference, and increase public awareness of – and resilience to – foreign interference activities.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #16, page 53</i></p> | PS/NSOD | CSIS RCMP JUS |
| <p>That the Government of Canada adopt a policy whereby no foreign single foreign vendor's products compose over 30% of the equipment in a private telecommunications vendor's network.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #17, page 62</i></p> | PS/NCSO | ISED CRTC FIN JUS |
| <p>That the Government of Canada prohibit state-owned enterprises, partial state-owned enterprises, and technology companies of the People's Republic of China from obtaining federal contracts or sub-contracts related to information and communication technology or security equipment or services.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #18, page 62</i></p> | ISED | CRTC PS/NCSB CSIS JUS RCMP FIN SSC |
| <i>Cyber Security</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |

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| <p>That the government examine the establishment of criteria for the federal procurement of Information Technology equipment, whereby the Communications Security Establishment would automatically be called upon to conduct supply chain cybersecurity risk assessments and/or supply chain integrity assessments if certain conditions are met, including equipment application and country of origin.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #20, page 62</i></p> | CSE | PS/NCSB JUS ISED SSC DND |
| <p>That the Government of Canada collaborate with provinces, major national security agencies, and federal departments involved to improve our resilience to cyber-attacks.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #21, page 62</i></p> | PS/NCSB | RCMP CSIS CSE SSC DND |
| Organized Crime | Lead | Contributors |
| <p>That Public Safety Canada report regularly to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on the extent and impact of organized crime, drug trafficking and concealing beneficial ownership information in Canada.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #22, page 65</i></p> | PS/CPB | JUS GAC RCMP |
| <p>That the Government of Canada explore ways to target organized crime groups and prevent them from entering Canada and expanding or forming alliances in Canada.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #23, page 65</i></p> | PS/CPB | JUS GAC RCMP CBSA |

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| That the Government of Canada expand its proposed beneficial ownership registry to include real estate and entities incorporated under provincial law. <i>Recommendation #24, page 65</i> | JUS | PS/CPB GAC RCMP |
| International and Regional Sphere: Projects & Policies | | |
| <i>Public Health</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |
| That the Government of Canada explore ways to increase access to information regarding infectious disease outbreaks in the People's Republic of China through international entities like the World Health Organization. <i>Recommendation #25, page 71</i> | PHAC | HC GAC |
| That Health Canada, through the Public Health Agency of Canada, study Taiwan's pandemic response and explore ways to increase information sharing with public health agencies in Taiwan. <i>Recommendation #26, page 71</i> | PHAC | HC GAC |
| <i>Arbitrary Detention Abroad</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |

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| <p>That Global Affairs Canada designate an individual to serve as a dedicated advocate for Canadians, regardless of where they were born and Canadians who hold dual citizenship, who are arbitrarily detained abroad, whose responsibilities include but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working with countries and multilateral organizations to promote the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations to more jurisdictions. • Assisting with consular affairs regarding Canadians who are arbitrarily detained abroad. • Exploring ways to protect Canadians from the practice of arbitrary detentions, more particularly in state-to-state relations. <p><i>Recommendation #27, page 75</i></p> | GAC | JUS IRCC |
| <i>The Arctic</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |
| <p>That, as a part of a whole-of-government plan to protect Canada's interest and sovereignty in the Arctic, the Government of Canada increase investment in scientific research and the security of waterways, energy resources, mineral deposits, and critical technologies.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #28, page 78</i></p> | ISED | PS/NCSB FIN NRCAN GAC DFO DND |
| <p>That the Government of Canada recognize the threat to Canadian Arctic sovereignty posed by the PRC in a renewed defence policy and commit the necessary resources to protect Canada's Arctic sovereignty.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #29, page 78</i></p> | DND (lead confirmed) | GAC DFO |

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| <p>That the Government of Canada expand its work with Indigenous communities in the Arctic to respect Indigenous rights while ensuring the security of Indigenous groups and Canadian sovereignty.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #30, page 78</i></p> | CIRNAC | GAC PS/NCSB RCMP |
| <p>That the Government of Canada work with like-minded Arctic states to promote multilateral cooperation, information sharing and collective security/defence.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #31, page 78</i></p> | GAC | DND PS/NCSB CSIS DFO DND |
| <p>That the Government of Canada explore ways to reduce non-Arctic states' influence on/ participation in resource exploration and exploitation, fishing, and scientific research in the Arctic.</p> <p><i>Recommendation #32, page 78</i></p> | GAC | DFO CIRNAC NRCAN |
| <i>The Indo-Pacific</i> | <i>Lead</i> | <i>Contributors</i> |
| <p>That the Government of Canada explore ways to increase security cooperation and cooperation on artificial intelligence, critical technologies and infrastructure with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region and multilateral organizations.</p> <p>Recommendation #33, page 81</p> | GAC | ISED PS/NSOD RCMP CSIS CSE DND |

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