



Transmittal Note / Bordereau de transmission

<b>To / Pour :</b>		<b>Date :</b>	
PM		Sep 8, 2023	
<b>Subject / Objet:</b>			
<b>Updated Threat Reduction Briefings to Parliamentarians</b>			
<b>From / De :</b>		<b>Via:</b>	
Name / Nom	Office / Bureau	Name / Nom	Office / Bureau
+ / -		+ / -	
		Jody Thomas	NSIA
<b>Approved By / Approuvé par :</b>		Drafting Officer / Rédacteur :	
Name / Nom	Office / Bureau		
+ / -		Admin typist / Dactylographe :	
Marie-Hélène Chayer	ADMO		
<b>Action Requested / Mesure de suivi :</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Your Signature / Votre signature <input type="checkbox"/> Your Comments / Vos commentaires <input type="checkbox"/> Your Meeting / Votre réunion <input type="checkbox"/> Your Decision / Votre décision <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Your Information / À titre d'information			
<b>For the attention of / À l'attention du:</b>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prime Minister / Premier ministre <input type="checkbox"/> Clerk / Greffier <input type="checkbox"/> Minister / Ministre			
<b>Remarks / Observations :</b>			

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Section/ Article 13    
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 Section/ Article 22    
 Section/ Article 23    
 Section/ Article 69

*See page 2 for a description of each Section / Consultez la page 2 pour obtenir une description pour chaque article.*

**ATIP delegated authority approval / Autorisation de l'autorité déléguée de l'AIPRP :**

Name / Nom	Signature
Marie-Hélène Chayer	

**Reference Numbers / Numéros de référence :**

WEBCIMS # 2023-SECOPS-00018     GCDocs Transmittal Note / Bordereau de transmission

GCDocs Briefing Note / Note d'information

GCDocs Other Numbers / Autres numéros

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SEP 11 2023

NSA to PM - PCO

IAS to PM - BCP



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Office of the National Security  
and Intelligence Advisor to the  
Prime Minister

Bureau de la Conseillère à la sécurité nationale  
et au renseignement auprès du  
Premier ministre

SEP 13 2023

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

SECRET / CEO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

c.c.: John Hannaford, Nathalie Drouin

UPDATE – UPCOMING THREAT REDUCTION BRIEFINGS TO  
PARLIAMENTARIANS  
(For Information)

**SUMMARY**

- The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) can employ Threat Reduction Measures (TRM), which have the principal purpose of reducing a threat as defined in the *CSIS Act*. TRM can include the provision of a classified briefing to disclose information on threats to the security of Canada.
- On May 16, 2023, the Minister of Public Safety issued a Ministerial Directive on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians (**TAB A**). The Minister directed CSIS, wherever possible, to “ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them.”
- Following this Ministerial Directive, CSIS identified parliamentarians to whom individualized threat information should be disclosed. CSIS conducted three TRM to disclose threats to Michael Chong (on May 2) and to Jenny Kwan and Erin O’Toole (on May 26).
- Following Mr. O’Toole’s speech in the House of Commons on May 30 (**TAB B**), Public Safety Canada (PS) and CSIS paused further disclosures to parliamentarians in order to develop a governance protocol through which the security and intelligence community would have the opportunity to review CSIS’ key messages for disclosure and the intelligence on which they are based.
- Now that the Governance Protocol for Threat Disclosures to Parliamentarians has been finalized (**TAB C**), CSIS plans to resume disclosures to parliamentarians. The first anticipated disclosure will be to former Member of Parliament (MP) Kenny Chiu. While Mr. Chiu is no longer a sitting MP, he may still be a subject of interest for the PRC.
- CSIS expects that past PRC-related interference attempts directed at Mr. Chiu will become public through an access to information request or the public inquiry. Such attention may revive PRC-related foreign interference actors’ interest in Mr. Chiu. CSIS intends to conduct the TRM before this occurs, in an effort to proactively inform Mr. Chiu.

Canada

SECRET / CEO**Governance Protocol for Threat Disclosures to Parliamentarians**

- The Protocol provides a governance process for the review of information, intelligence and key messages that CSIS plans to convey to parliamentarians.
- Under the Protocol, CSIS prepares a threat briefing package of the information on the threat to national security directed at the parliamentarian, including classified intelligence. CSIS also prepares key messages that CSIS officials will use to brief the parliamentarian on the intelligence.
- The threat briefing package is first reviewed by a group of Assistant Deputy Ministers before it is referred to the Deputy Ministers' Committee on Intelligence Response (DM CIR). The purpose of this discussion is to provide advice to the Director of CSIS, address any outstanding concerns with the key messages and decide on a coordinated approach to briefing Ministers.

**Access to Information Request**

- CSIS must respond to an Access to Information (ATI) request by September 15, 2023, that pertains to a document inadvertently placed in the public domain. This document states CSIS' intention to provide general briefings to Mr. Chiu and Mr. Chong regarding foreign interference activity from the PRC.
- CSIS' ATI unit informs that it will not redact Mr. Chiu and Mr. Chong's names from the release because a still photograph taken at a parliamentary appearance inadvertently placed the document in the public domain.
- CSIS provided general briefings to Mr. Chiu and Mr. Chong in June 2021. Since the Ministerial Directive, CSIS completed an individualized disclosure to Mr. Chong (on May 2, 2023). Plans for a TRM for Mr. Chiu was paused while the Governance Protocol was finalised.

**Threat information and key messages**

- CSIS is planning to meet with Mr. Chiu and to discuss threats to the security of Canada directed at him using classified information. The key messages for this disclosure are at **TAB D**.

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SECRET / CEO

- CSIS plans to convey that Mr. Chiu was the target of a disinformation campaign on WeChat leading up to the 2021 federal election. Mr. Chiu has publicly claimed that this disinformation campaign negatively affected his chances of being elected in 2021. CSIS will convey that it cannot directly attribute the campaign to PRC officials, nor measure the impact of the disinformation campaign. This information had been relayed to the Panel according to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol. The Panel determined that the threshold for informing Canadians of an incident that threatens Canada's ability to have a free and fair election during the caretaker period had not been met.
- CSIS will also inform Mr. Chiu that PRC officials likely maintain interest in Mr. Chiu's activities through proxies, due to his support for causes contrary to the PRC's interests. CSIS will further inform Mr. Chiu that they are not aware of any physical threats to Mr. Chiu or his family at this time.
- CSIS has previously met with Mr. Chiu [redacted] on June 25, 2021 for a security awareness briefing, [redacted]


**PCO Comment**

- In September 2021, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force observed potential disinformation related to candidates, including Mr. Chiu. In October 2021, the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) provided a package of information to PCO regarding thirteen ridings – including that of Mr. Chiu – that the CPC claimed were possibly affected by foreign interference during the federal election.
- In October 2021, SITE conducted an assessment to respond to the claims. Based on available information, SITE could not decisively conclude that the PRC sought to clandestinely and deceptively influence outcomes in all of the thirteen ridings identified by the CPC. Additionally, SITE could not conclusively assess to what extent a foreign government sought to clandestinely orchestrate online and/or media efforts to discredit the CPC, its candidates, or policies with the specific intent to influence the outcome of the election.

SECRET / CEO

- PCO notes that the scale and pervasive nature of online disinformation poses significant challenge to the intelligence community's ability to identify and attribute every instance of foreign interference targeting Canadian Parliamentarians.

- CSIS plans to acknowledge the challenge of online attribution in its key messages to Mr. Chiu.
- PCO notes that, should Mr. Chiu publicly divulge any information CSIS provides him, there may be increased public interest in the Government of Canada's approach to measuring the impact of observed disinformation campaigns, as well as attributing such campaigns as foreign interference activity.
- CSIS and Public Safety are developing a responsive communications plan for the ATI release and should any part of their discussion with Mr. Chiu become public.
- In addition to PCO informing you of the disclosure to Mr. Chiu, DM CIR agreed that CSIS would inform the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Safety and National Defence in writing of this TRM disclosure.

  
for Jody Thomas

Attachments

Chayer/

TAB | A  
Onglet

Government  
of CanadaGouvernement  
du Canada

Canada

[Public Safety Canada](#)[Home](#) → [Transparency](#) → [Ministerial Directions](#)→ [Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliame...](#)

## Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians

The Parliament of Canada is at the heart of Canada's democracy. As such, it is imperative that all parliamentarians are able to exercise their roles fully and without hindrance or interference from foreign states or hostile actors.

To this end, I expect that threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament and parliamentarians, including those conducted through their family and staff, receive the highest level of attention from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in collaboration with the national security and intelligence community. In doing so, I continue to expect that CSIS will at all times respect the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and the rule of law.

Pursuant to subsection 6(2) of the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*, I have issued the following direction to describe my expectations in this regard.

1. CSIS will investigate all threats to the security of Canada that target Parliament and parliamentarians in a manner proportional to the threat and the importance of Parliament to Canada's democracy and national security.
2. When CSIS assesses, in accordance with its mandate, there to be a threat to the security of Canada directed at Parliament or a parliamentarian, it will pursue the appropriate lawful methods in response, including but not limited to the taking of threat reduction measures and disclosures to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other law enforcement agencies.
3. CSIS will seek, wherever possible within the law and while protecting the security and integrity of national security and intelligence operations and investigations, to ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them. This may involve direct disclosures, or by working with other bodies, such as Government of Canada departments, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or other law enforcement agencies, as the law permits.
4. The Minister of Public Safety will be informed of all instances of threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament or parliamentarians in a timely manner and with an explanation of how CSIS will implement the above directions.

**Date modified:**

2023-05-16

TAB | B  
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SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY  
SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

c.c.: John Hannaford, Nathalie G. Drouin, Daniel Rogers

BRIEFING TO MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

(Information Only)

**SUMMARY**

- The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) conducted a Threat Reduction Measure with Mr. Erin O'Toole on May 26, 2023. CSIS included unverified details from intelligence reporting in the briefing to Mr. O'Toole in an effort to provide him with "complete information" of possible threats against him, in the spirit of the Directive issued by the Minister of Public Safety on May 16, 2023.
- On May 30, 2023, Mr. O'Toole delivered a speech on foreign interference in the House of Commons based on information provided by CSIS.
- Parts of Mr. O'Toole's speech misconstrued or overstated that information.
- CSIS confirmed that some of the information communicated to Mr. O'Toole was not shared with the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, the Right Honourable David Johnston, as he prepared his first report on foreign interference in past federal elections because it was not deemed "sufficiently reliable".
- Mr. Johnston has since produced a supplement to the confidential annex of his report, in which he concludes that Mr. O'Toole's remarks are not consistent with the briefing he received from CSIS.

**Background**

- MP Erin O'Toole was the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) going into the 2021 General Election. Part of Mr. O'Toole's leadership platform was to "take a tough stance on Beijing", including recognizing the People's Republic of China (PRC) regime's persecution of the country's Uyghur minority as a genocide, repatriating and diversifying Canadian supply chains away from China, and cracking down on foreign influenced activities in Canada.

**CSIS Briefing to Mr. O'Toole**

- On May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2023, the Minister of Public Safety issued a Ministerial Directive on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians (**TAB A**). This directive included the expectation that CSIS seek, wherever possible, to "ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them."
- In implementing this Directive, CSIS identified and shared all information pertaining to Mr. O'Toole, including unverified information from intelligence reporting. The unverified information provided to Mr. O'Toole (identified in **TAB B**) included indications of a PRC disinformation campaign, not that it was aimed at Mr. O'Toole specifically.
- In its engagement with Mr. O'Toole, CSIS specified that the briefing included unverified information.

**Speech in the House of Commons**

- On May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2023, Mr. O'Toole delivered a speech on foreign interference in the House of Commons. In his speech, he discussed the classified information he received from CSIS, including the unverified information about a PRC disinformation campaign, without providing any caveats as to the reliability of the unverified information.
- A table detailing the specific instances in which Mr. O'Toole's statements did not accurately reflect the information CSIS provided him is included in **TAB B**.
- During his allocution, Mr. O'Toole referred to the freedom of speech provisions of parliamentary privilege in the House of Commons.

**Independent Special Rapporteur**

- The Standing House of Commons Procedure and House Affairs Committee (PROC) has been conducting a review on foreign interference since Fall 2022. Departments produced documents to support their review.
- On Tuesday June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2023, Mr. Johnston appeared before PROC to testify in support of the Committee's study on foreign interference and was questioned about the alleged campaign against Mr. O'Toole.
- The Committee referred to a September 14, 2021, Rapid Response Mechanism report that mentions a potential Chinese Communist Party (CCP) information operation. The report indicates that "in what may be the result of a CCP information operation" to influence Canadians of Chinese heritage, WeChat news accounts continue to share a story originally published in the Global Times that CPC leader Erin O'Toole "almost wants to break relations with China". A copy is in **TAB C**.
- Mr. Johnston testified that the information and intelligence he reviewed during his study did not provide conclusive evidence that the activity in question was state-sponsored. One PROC member opined that this suggests Mr. Johnston's review of foreign interference in Canada was incomplete.
- While the ISR team had not received all uncorroborated intelligence pertaining to Mr. O'Toole before they produced their report, the ISR team had unfettered and unprecedented access to classified information, as well as the Rapid Response Mechanism reports.
- The ISR team was briefed on CSIS' analysis of allegations of foreign interference in the 2021 election, which concluded that the alleged interference could not be conclusively attributed to a state actor. Mr. Johnston was also aware of concerns that had been raised by Mr. O'Toole and the CPC.
- After Mr. O'Toole's speech in the House of Commons, CSIS provided all related intelligence to the ISR and additional interviews with Service employees, including Director Vigneault, took place.

**PCO Comment**

- In the Supplement to the Confidential Annex of his report, the ISR indicated that Mr. O'Toole's speech in the House of Commons did not accurately convey the contents of his CSIS briefing. The ISR also urged the Government and the House of Commons to consider options so that these briefings are less likely to become politicized.

- Solicitor-Client Privilege

- PCO has been working with Public Safety Canada and CSIS to refine the protocol to implement the Minister of Public Safety's May, 2023 Directive. The protocol is now being considered by the Deputy Minister Committee on Intelligence Response. The proposed approach calls for CSIS to provide detailed information in advance of engagements under the Directive in order to ensure stakeholders' awareness.
- Public Safety Canada is also considering options to adjust the implementation of the Directive to allow CSIS to more effectively triage the intelligence shared with parliamentarians.
- We will keep you abreast of developments.

Jody Thomas

**Attachments**

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MINISTERIAL DIRECTION ON THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF CANADA  
DIRECTED AT PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENTARIANS

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GOVERNANCE PROTOCOL FOR THREAT DISCLOSURES TO PARLIAMENTARIANS

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**Initiation and Application:**

- CSIS will initiate this protocol whenever it assesses that there exists a threat to the security of Canada directed at a parliamentarian and identifies that disclosure of information to the parliamentarian is possible within the law and while protecting the security and integrity of national security and intelligence operations and investigations. This includes disclosures conducted as threat reduction measures as well as under other authorities.
- CSIS will assess that a threat exists in accordance with its mandate, as established by the *CSIS Act*, including by applying the definition of threats to the security of Canada and fulfilling its role as an intelligence collector and assessor. These functions involve the application of judgement, professional practice, and expertise.
- As such, CSIS will assess that a threat exists per its operational procedures and practices for assessing intelligence. CSIS is expected to take into account all available information on the threat, capabilities and intentions of the threat actor, with due regard to whether the information is credible, corroborated, and particularized to the individual being briefed.
- Only information on a credible threat to the security of Canada directed at a parliamentarian that is differentiated from legitimate activities (lawful advocacy, protest, dissent, diplomatic activity) *may* be disclosed, unless the Service assesses that these activities are being carried on in conjunction with or in support of a suspected threat to the security of Canada.

**Protocol:**

1. **Threat Briefing Package:**

- **Intelligence package** of the information on the threat to national security directed at the parliamentarian, including published products and extracts from undissemated intelligence.
- **Key messages** for the threat-specific briefing. This will be used by two CSIS officials to brief the MP on the intelligence.

2. **ADM Consultation:** CSIS will share the threat briefing package prior to a meeting of the ADM National Security Operations (Tactical) committee for discussion.

- In addition to CSIS, participants will include Public Safety Canada, the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, the RCMP, and any other implicated departments or agencies. The discussion will include consideration of the intelligence products and Key Messages. Any changes to the Key Messages that are requested must be provided in writing with appropriate accountabilities.

3. ***DM Consultation:*** After the ADM consultation, CSIS will bring the threat briefing package – revised if necessary – to a meeting of the Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Intelligence Response. The purpose of this discussion is to provide advice to the Director of CSIS; the advice of DMs will be recorded in a record of discussion and any requested changes must be provided in writing. DMs will also decide on an approach to briefing Ministers.
4. ***CSIS Approvals of Operational Plan:*** CSIS will seek the necessary internal approvals for the operational activity (e.g. TRM or s. 12 interview). This will include conducting a four-pillar risk assessment, including consultations with Justice and, where there is a foreign policy component, Global Affairs Canada.
5. ***Briefing/Approval of Minister of Public Safety:*** CSIS will share the threat briefing package with the Minister of Public Safety. As per ministerial direction, if CSIS plans to undertake a threat reduction measure that attracts a high risk under any of the four pillars, the approval of the Minister of Public Safety will be sought.
  - The Deputy Minister of Public Safety will provide any advice that may be needed.
  - If recommended or requested, the Minister may receive a verbal briefing from CSIS and Public Safety Canada.
  - Responsive communications lines will be developed in consultation/coordination with partners as appropriate in the circumstances.
6. ***Brief Ministers:*** The threat briefing package will be shared with other Ministers, as directed by DMs. At its discretion, PCO will also brief the Prime Minister on the operational plan.
7. ***Conduct Operational Activity:*** CSIS will brief the parliamentarian, using the Key Messages and according to the appropriate authority. The briefing will be conducted by two officials from CSIS with subject matter experts to support as necessary.
8. ***Rapid Debrief:*** CSIS will provide a rapid read out via Issues Management Brief and disseminate it to the ADM NS OPS (Tactical) meeting participants and established points of contact. Additional ADM NS OPS or DM CIR meetings may be convened to coordinate ongoing issues management, if required.

**Record keeping:** Records of decision will be kept for all ADM and DM meetings as well as ministerial briefings where approval or direction is provided.

**Modification for conflicts of interest:** Public servants, exempt staff, and Ministers operate in and around Parliament. There is a risk that individuals involved in this process have an interest in the outcome. From time to time, adjustments to the protocol may be needed to limit distribution of a document or otherwise modify a step to avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest. If CSIS identifies such a concern, they will raise it with Public Safety Canada for agreement on the revised process for that specific instance.

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**Proposed Key Messages:  
Kenny CHIU Threat Briefing**

- Further to the September 7<sup>th</sup> 2023 announcement, and in advance of the September 18<sup>th</sup> start date of the public inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, we wanted to brief you on the intelligence we possessed regarding the People's Republic of China's (PRC) threat of foreign interference involving you at that time of the 2021 Federal election.
- We believe these threats to be relevant today to current and former MPs. There also may be an increase in media requests regarding your experience with FI activities with respect to the PRC. As such, we would ask that you respect our caveats and not disclose classified information.
- At no time have we collected intelligence indicating a physical threat to you or your family, here in Canada or elsewhere. Threat to life intelligence triggers rapid engagement with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and notification to the subject in question.
- Due to your support for causes contrary to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) interests and which directly infringed on PRC redlines (e.g. Hong Kong's National Security Law, Xinjiang genocide motion, foreign influence registry bill), the PRC perceives you as someone who is resolutely anti-China.
- CSIS intelligence indicates that in 2021, there was a disinformation campaign related to your proposed Bill C-282. The disinformation campaign, which was geared towards Chinese diaspora communities in Canada, took place over WeChat and in Chinese language media. Several articles on WeChat appeared to falsely claim that your proposed foreign influence registry bill was motivated by anti-Asian racism and was intended to suppress the Canadian-Chinese community. These articles further advocated for the community not to vote for the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC).
- It could not however, be confirmed that the disinformation campaign was created by, originated from, or disseminated at the direction of PRC officials. Attribution of online disinformation, notably via WeChat remains a challenge.

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- PRC officials maintained an interest in your activities but noted the sensitivities involved if officials approached you directly. As such, they engaged proxies to carry out their activities as a means of obfuscating the PRC's involvement.
- Proxies for PRC officials are usually affiliated with PRC-run organizations, including the United Front Work Department (UFWD),

- Chinese Communist Party (CCP) United Front Work (UFW) is primarily coordinated by the UFWD, which is directly subordinate to the CCP Central Committee, a body of approximately 200 individuals who represent the apex of political power in the PRC.
- For the PRC, FI is undertaken as United Front Work (UFW), through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to coopt, reorient, or silence non-party elites (e.g., those with perceived influence). This occurs both within and outside of China, to adopt or otherwise support Party narratives and policies, or at the least to not actively oppose them.
- The current Head of the UFWD is a member of the CCP Central Committee's Politburo, which is a smaller body who run the PRC on a more day-to-day basis
  - The Politburo is a more accurate equivalent to Canada's Cabinet
  - The official Cabinet-equivalent in the PRC system is the PRC State Council, but the State Council has no real decision-making power, it is more of an implementation body
- In other words, UFW is perceived as essential to the survival of the CCP and as a result, UFW is managed and directed by the highest levels of the CCP leadership

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SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- It is important to note that in the context of UFWD, "target" is a word used to denote a general interest in an individual. Actions used to "work on" a target (i.e. targeting someone) can range from overt, direct diplomatic engagement to the use of proxies or the engagement of PRC security and intelligence services.
- Your continued advocacy of social and policy issues contrary to PRC's interests means that you should expect that the PRC will continue to look at your activities as detrimental to their national interests, especially if you decide to run for elected office again.

### **Responsives / Potential Media Lines**

#### **Why has it taken so long for this classified briefing?**

- Further to the increased threat of FI activities due to disclosures in the media and the subsequent Ministerial Directive and new protocol for briefing MPs and parliamentarians, the Service is undergoing the process of meeting with select MPs as per the directive.
- As a former MP that has been subject of a disinformation campaign it was important to provide you with a briefing to advise you of the classified information, and the assessment of it, that you were not privy to prior to implementation of the new Ministerial Directives.

#### ***Why did you not brief MPs and candidates during GE44?***

- During the writ period, SITE members regularly invited representatives from political parties – including the CPC, LPC, NDP, BQ and GPC for threat briefings on SITE members' findings.
- As officials have discussed in public and before Parliamentary committees, not all intelligence is clearly actionable.
- This is especially the case when it is not possible to fully attribute information manipulation to a malign foreign state. In such contexts, responses rest on probabilities and likelihoods and must be carefully calibrated to avoid doing more harm than good, like negatively affecting freedom of expression or inadvertently amplifying disinformation narratives
- (U//OUO) SITE TF also observed online/media activities aimed at discouraging Canadians, particularly of Chinese heritage, from supporting the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), party leader Erin O'Toole, and yourself in GE44. SITE TF did not have clear evidence that this online activity was a PRC-directed FI campaign, we have observed indicators of potential

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coordination between various Canada-based Chinese language news outlets as well as PRC and CCP news outlets

- (U//OUO) Following a deep dive into Canada's Sinophone media ecosystem, SITE TF identified numerous articles posted and shared among PRC and Canada-based Chinese-language news websites and WeChat news accounts containing false claims about you and your Private Members' Bill C-282 (An Act to establish the Foreign Influence Registry). The articles claimed that, if elected, Chiu would pass a "foreign power registry act" that would designate "any individual or group connected with China as a spokesperson of the Chinese government."
- (U//OUO) The articles portrayed Chiu and Bill C-282 in a false or misleading way, and the narrative appeared embedded or alongside other news stories that claimed Conservative Party leader Erin O'Toole "almost wanted to break diplomatic relations with China" with his GE44 platform.
- (U//OUO) In some cases, SITE TF was able to track down web or WeChat news articles that made the specious claims; however, in more transient forms of media, such as radio broadcasts and private messages in group chats, they were not able to observe the content, and relied on the testimony of others who did see or hear it.

#### **Whether or not the election results were affected by the FI activity (in 2021)?**

- The Service holds no information to suggest that any election results were affected by PRC FI activity.
- (S//CEO) At the time, SITE TF noted that there is a common narrative in these articles, and that the close timing and publication of similar content across several platforms is unusual. SITE TF also notes that some of the material mirrors narratives publicly presented by the PRC government and the CCP. However, to reiterate, there was / is currently no intelligence indicating the PRC government or the CCP clandestinely or deceptively coordinated the content and/or publication of these narratives in 2021.
- The Service does not investigate community activism unless there are reasonable grounds to believe it is being directed by a hostile state actor.

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

While we assessed there were reasonable grounds to believe that you were a target of clandestine PRC - directed foreign interference in this election, however a definitive attribution link to the PRC CCP did not materialize. We have no information, data or metrics to provide a impact assessment specific to your situation

- The PIFI Terms of References also include direction to the Commissioner to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the last two Federal elections at the national and electoral district levels. This includes from state and non-state actors, such as proxies of the UFWD. CSIS looks forward to the Commissioner's findings and recommendations.

***What is the Government doing about it?***

- The initial effort is primarily focussed on informing MPs about these disinformation campaigns and ongoing attribution challenges
- GoC will be conducting diplomatic engagement with PRC representatives in Canada to convey our serious concerns with the activity observed on WeChat.
- Global Affairs Canada is also devising a strategy to engage with the company – Tencent – about this activity, with a view to discussing content moderation requirements.
- There are ongoing discussions on how best to share information, while adhering to fundamental privacy rights of Canadians, with government partners and other stakeholders such as academia to encourage further research and analysis into foreign information manipulation and interference in relation to Canadian democratic institutions.