

For Public Release

S//CEO

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

Package Summary

SITE-2024/0213A - S//CEO

2024 FEDERAL BY-ELECTIONS - 2024 FEDERAL BY-ELECTIONS - SITE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THREATS TO CANADIAN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS – 2024

Value: None Marginal Direct Significant Critical **Use(s):** Knowledge Briefing Publication Operations planning Policy-making Negotiations Law enforcement **Feedback Comment(s):***SITE-2024/0213 - S//CEO*

2024 FEDERAL BY-ELECTIONS - 2024 FEDERAL BY-ELECTIONS - SITE TF SITREP: 13 FEBRUARY 2024

Value: None Marginal Direct Significant Critical **Use(s):** Knowledge Briefing Publication Operations planning Policy-making Negotiations Law enforcement **Feedback Comment(s):***SITE-2024/02/06A - S//CEO*

2024 FEDERAL BY-ELECTIONS - BASELINE THREAT ASSESSMENT – MARCH 4, 2024, DURHAM BY-ELECTION

Value: None Marginal Direct Significant Critical **Use(s):** Knowledge Briefing Publication Operations planning Policy-making Negotiations Law enforcement **Feedback Comment(s):***SITE-2024/02/06 - S//CEO*

2024 FEDERAL BY-ELECTIONS - SITE TF SITREP: 6 February 2024

Value: None Marginal Direct Significant Critical **Use(s):** Knowledge Briefing Publication Operations planning Policy-making Negotiations Law enforcement **Feedback Comment(s):**

1 of 1

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET/[] CANADIAN EYES ONLY

FEBRUARY 2024

SITE TF UPDATE

SITE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THREATS TO CANADIAN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS—2024

This assessment covers the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE TF) observations of foreign threat actors' intentions and activities relating to foreign interference (FI) since the 44th Canadian General Election (GE44) in September 2021. Also included in this update are activities that occurred prior to September 2021 of which SITE TF became aware []. While domestic terrorism threats are not strictly part of the SITE TF mandate, we recognize the need to provide assessments on this issue. As a result, an annex on the domestic violent extremism landscape is included as part of this threat update. (S//CEO)

Key Assessments

- Sophisticated, pervasive and persistent FI activities constitute a serious threat to Canada's national security and the integrity of Canada's democratic institutions. For certain foreign states, FI activities are part of their normal pattern of behaviour in Canada and often peak during election periods. (S//CEO)
- Certain foreign states use FI activities to influence Canadian politics by (i) deceptively supporting individuals who are perceived to be receptive to foreign state interests, and (ii) opposing individuals who are perceived to be against these foreign states. To accomplish their goals, threat actors exploit loopholes in political party nomination processes; engage in money and financing operations; mobilize and leverage community organizations; conduct information operations; and, engage in computer network exploitation (CNE) activities. (S//CEO)
- The People's Republic of China (PRC), India, Russia and Pakistan have engaged in FI activities in Canada [] []—the PRC and India being the most active. PRC FI activities in future Canadian elections will likely use greater clandestine and deceptive elements, [] []. The Government of India (GoI) will likely continue [] its use of disinformation [] (S//CEO)

The Threat

1. FI involves the use of clandestine or deceptive practices to influence Canadian policymaking, public narratives and civil society in a way that obfuscates the role and interests of the foreign state or actor. FI is not synonymous with diplomatic activity. Traditional diplomacy works through recognized channels to achieve specific policy outcomes or objectives (e.g., trade negotiations with the United States). However, diplomats from some states routinely engage in activities that cross the line from acceptable overt diplomatic engagement to clandestine interference. FI often takes place in a legal and normative grey zone, an area where activities fall beneath legal thresholds, where no laws exist to regulate the activity, or where the interpretation of the activities and the permissibility of those activities are ambiguous. (S//CEO)

Foreign Interference

SITE TF defines Foreign Interference (FI) as: "activity conducted or supported by a foreign state/actor that is detrimental to Canadian national interests and is clandestine, deceptive or involves a threat to a person." (U)

2. Foreign states that engage in FI target all levels of government in Canada—including federal, provincial, municipal and Indigenous—and various facets of Canadian civil society (e.g., diaspora groups, the general public, media entities). FI activities transcend party lines, ideologies and ethnic backgrounds. (S//CEO)

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET// CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

3. Canada is a high-priority FI target for four primary reasons: (i) Canada is an important member of the Five-Eyes community—a grouping of significant interest to some foreign states, given its intelligence collection capabilities—and other key alliances and international bodies (e.g., G7, NATO); (ii) Canada has a robust international reputation that can be used or co-opted to help legitimize foreign state interests; (iii) Canada is a reliable and open trading partner with an advanced, knowledge-based economy that can support foreign state development objectives, particularly in science and technology; and, (iv) Canada is home to large diaspora communities, which some foreign states seek to monitor, control and leverage in the furthering of their strategic goals. (S//CEO)

4. Foreign states develop important relationships in Canada year round to further their own political platforms. They use these relationships to their advantage, notably around election time. As elections are integral to the proper functioning of liberal democratic societies, they represent a 'window of opportunity' for foreign states to influence or sway electoral outcomes. (S//CEO)

Office of Protocol at Global Affairs Canada

At the outset of Canadian Federal Elections, the Office of Protocol at Global Affairs Canada (GAC) sends a letter to the foreign heads of missions, embassies and consulates, international organizations and special representative offices in Canada reminding them that, "consistent with Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Article 55 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, they have the duty to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the receiving state." This letter is sent in accordance with standard practices for the Office of Protocol at GAC; the last letter was sent on August 20, 2021, ahead of the federal elections that year. The letter is available in its entirety upon request. (U//OUO)

Methodologies/Tools

5. Foreign states use FI and seek to influence Canadian politics by clandestinely supporting candidates or elected officials who are perceived to be receptive to the foreign state policies, narratives and geopolitical strategies. At the same time, these foreign states actively oppose individuals who are perceived to be against their interests. Some foreign states target all levels of government (federal, provincial, territorial and municipal), as well as Canadian communities. The following represents key methodologies used by foreign states to interfere in Canadian democratic institutions. (S//CEO)

Exploiting loopholes in political party nomination processes

6. Nomination processes for political parties in Canada are not regulated by federal or provincial government legislation or enforcement bodies (e.g., Elections Canada and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections). Each political party sets and enforces its own rules, and party members can vote in nomination races, regardless of their legal status in Canada. For example, individuals who are not Canadian citizens—and therefore cannot vote in elections at any level of government in Canada—can still vote in a party nomination process as long as they are party members. In some instances, the membership fee is paid for, or reimbursed by, a hostile state actor (HSA) or its proxies. The nomination process can be critical, as many ridings in Canada are considered 'safe seats' that have long been held by a particular political party. In other words, gaining a party's nomination in a riding that has long supported that party is akin to winning the subsequent election. Therefore, FI activities during the nomination race could achieve the desired outcome without reliance upon FI activities during the election period. FI actors exploit this loophole to engage in FI that target specific candidates and particular electoral ridings. (S)

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET// CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024*Money and financing operations*

7. FI actors also channel monetary donations and other material assistance to preferred candidates in elections, with the intent of fostering a bond of obligation. This is usually done via trusted interlocutors, such as proxy agents or co-opted community organizations. The sense of obligation can then be leveraged for privileged access to the official and for policy positions that are in the national interests of the foreign state—potentially to the detriment of Canada. Furthermore, this bond serves to solidify foreign state proxies as gatekeepers for community support. Should the preferred candidate pursue a course of action contrary to that of the foreign state, community support would likely be withdrawn and the candidate could potentially lose the next election. (S)

Mobilizing and leveraging community organizations

8. Local community networks are a key vector for facilitating FI activities. For example, PRC officials often conduct regular FI activities through local networks that are tied to—but not necessarily directed by—^{PRC officials in} ^{Canada}. Key components of these FI networks usually include (i) ^{PRC officials in} ^{Canada} (ii) leaders of local Chinese Canadian community groups; (iii) staff of targeted candidates/elected officials; and, (iv) political candidates/officials themselves. This network structure—used for interference at all levels of government—enables an adaptable, resilient approach to extending and enabling PRC covert influence. The role played by each component varies by location and campaign, and much of the assistance rendered is likely shielded intentionally from broad public scrutiny. (S)

Conducting information operations

9. Traditional and online media outlets, including social media, play an important role during election periods, offering a curated communication channel between political campaigns and the general public. As such, they are a target for FI activities from actors who seek to manipulate and influence key media entities, control narratives, and disseminate disinformation. (S)

10. In Canada, a PRC "takeover" of Chinese-language media has transpired over decades, derivative of the proportion of PRC-origin individuals increasing in Canada's Chinese communities and as the PRC devotes more resources to, in President Xi Jinping's words, "telling China's story well". For example, in December 2020, a former editor-in-chief of one of Canada's most popular Chinese-language newspapers, explicitly stated, "Beijing has become the mainstream now in Chinese newspapers or magazine here [in Canada]... I cannot find a real independent and non-partisan newspaper here [in Canada] reporting Chinese affairs. I cannot find one for you". (S)

11. Technological advancements in generative-AI will enhance foreign electoral interference efforts, since it aims to control narratives, shape public opinion and/or discredit factual information. These AI-enabled efforts include the creation of synthetic content for social media, such as the production of deepfake videos or imagery of elected officials or public figures, or the generation of fabricated digital representations of human beings (i.e., "avatars") that provide false "news" content. Further, "smart" propaganda platforms that leverage generative-AI and big data analytics can be used to improve the ability of foreign state actors to identify and counter undesirable online sentiments during an election cycle and optimize amplification of counter-narratives to make them the accepted "truth". SITE assesses that influence campaigns that leverage generative-AI have the potential to be highly effective and can be a major tool of FI in upcoming elections in Canada. (TS/)

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET// CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024*Cyber threat activity*

12. Consistent with the 2019 and 2021 Canadian Federal elections, there is no evidence that state actors pose a specific cyber threat to Canadian elections infrastructure or electoral processes. As technology becomes predominant in future elections, it could yield additional threat vectors. Political parties, candidates and their staff continue to be targeted by cyber threat activity; however, this will likely take the form of cyber espionage, disinformation or deepfakes in the future. (U)

13. , PRC cyber threat actors were engaged in ongoing hostile and covert cyber activity against targets at multiple levels of government in Canada, including the use of email operations targeting the personal and work accounts of GC personnel and CNE operations targeting GC networks. Known targets have largely consisted of current and former Canadian politicians, including ministers, Members of Parliament, senators and current and former employees of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). While this activity was almost certainly conducted in support of the PRC's FI collection, SITE cannot discount the possibility that similar tactics could be used during an election cycle in order to gather intelligence on campaign strategies, fundraising efforts, or possibly policy stances that might negatively impact the CCP's strategic objectives." (TS//CEO)

Threat Actors***People's Republic of China:***

14. The PRC is the most active state actor engaging in FI activities in Canada. FI activities are part of the PRC's normal pattern of behaviour and are active at all times. The PRC seeks to conduct interference activities against all levels of government. In keeping with previous patterns of observed behaviour and strategy, the PRC remains party agnostic and pragmatic. The PRC will support candidates from any party, as long as a candidate is perceived as being 'friendly' to the PRC, or vulnerable for other reasons (e.g., sizeable diaspora population, important business presence in a riding) who, the PRC could leverage for influence and/or access. (S//CEO)

15. The CCP in particular uses Canada and Canadians to proactively support PRC interests. This includes rejecting and publicly criticizing US policies—specifically those that harm the PRC—supporting international PRC initiatives (e.g., the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative), positively portraying the PRC and the CCP, and exhibiting a general 'deference' to the PRC's authority and interests. (S//CEO)

proxies are aware of the CCP's preferences and are self-directed in terms of acting in ways to reflect those interests.

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET/[] CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

[] FI activities – PRC

- []
- []

- From July to September 2023, multiple Canadian MPs, including the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, were the subject of a PRC-linked cyber influence operation, in which the MPs were accused on social media of criminal acts and ethical violations. Some of the posts included links to deepfake videos of a Vancouver-based Chinese dissident and CCP critic making inflammatory accusations of MPs, including against the PM. While SITE assesses that the posts were ultimately meant to harm the standing of the Chinese dissident, the use of fabricated allegations against Canadian MPs suggests that a more targeted approach that is specifically meant to harm Canadian public figures may be a realistic possibility during an upcoming election cycle. (S//CEO)

- []

- *Redacted text indicates the PRC may adjust their FI strategies over time to maximize their influence over democratic processes.*

- []

- []

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET///CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

- *Redacted text describes an example of a Canadian politician at the municipal level appearing to espouse certain narratives relating to the "Five Poisons".*
- | | |
|--|--|
| | |
| | |

Five Poisons

The "Five Poisons" is a term used by the CCP to refer to five groups that are viewed as a significant threat to the stability and legitimacy of the CCP to rule China:

- 1) Falun Gong members
- 2) Uyghurs
- 3) Tibetans
- 4) Individuals who are pro-Taiwan
- 5) Individuals who are pro-democracy (U)

- *Redacted text provides an example of potential PRC interference in a municipal democratic process.*

- *Redacted text provides an example of potential PRC interference in a provincial democratic process.*
- | | |
|--|--|
| | |
| | |

- *Redacted text describes an example of a Canadian politician at the provincial level appearing to self-censor in relation to certain issues relating to the "Five Poisons".*

CSIS intelligence on the GE44 collected and assessed after the conclusion of the federal election:

- | | |
|--|--|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET///CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

- [Redacted]

India:

18. India the second-most active state actor engaging in FI activities in Canada, behind the PRC. While the Government of India (GoI)'s FI activities are they are nonetheless persistent, pervasive and evolving. Indian FI activity is largely focussed on the Indo-Canadian diaspora communities; however, the GoI is also opportunistic and will seek to leverage prominent non-Indo-Canadians to achieve India's FI goals, where it suits India's interests. SITE assesses that the GoI seeks to covertly influence Canadian officials at all levels of government to take positions and decisions that are favourable to the GoI. Indian officials rely on a network of Canada-based proxy and pro-GoI actors, including community organizations—

[Redacted]

19. GoI officials remain particularly concerned with India's image abroad. Countering all activities and narratives it considers 'anti-India' and anti-Hindu remains a priority for the GoI in its FI strategy.

[Redacted]

20. Disinformation is a key tool use by the GoI to achieve its FI objectives.

[Redacted]

Indian disinformation would be aimed at supporting the election of pro-GoI candidates and undermining the campaigns of

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET [] /CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

perceived 'anti-India' candidates, and such GoI actions would be considered deceptive and clandestine activity that is detrimental to Canadian interests. (S//CEO)

[]

[]

As India continues to develop its cyber capabilities,

[]

[] reporting examples – **India**:

- []

- []

- []

- []

- []

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET// [] /CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

[] pressure at the hands of GoI officials and their proxies are likely to be used opportunistically during elections at all levels of government. (TS//CEO)

- []

- [] []

- *A body of intelligence indicates that a GoI proxy agent may have attempted to interfere in democratic processes, reportedly including through the clandestine provision of illicit financial support to various Canadian politicians as a means of attempting to secure the election of pro-GoI candidates or gaining influence over candidates who take office. Any such financial contribution could have remained unknown to the candidate.*
[]

- []

Russia:

23. Russia has focussed its FI activities globally on discrediting democratic institutions and processes, with an ultimate goal of destabilizing or delegitimizing democratic states. Russia has the capability to engage in FI against Canada; however, it lacks the intent as Canada is not perceived as an existential threat to Russia in the same way as the United States (its "main adversary"). While SITE assesses that Russia does not prefer a particular Canadian political party or leader through which Russian FI could be directed and that the Kremlin likely assesses that major Canadian federal parties do not differ significantly in their stance towards Russia, Russian cyber actors are not above seeking to target and undermine specific individuals who are

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET// [] CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

deemed to be 'anti-Russian'. []
[]

24. As part of its foreign-influenced operations, Russia carries out disinformation efforts in the West. Russian intelligence services (RIS) and other state-linked actors conduct disinformation and information campaigns to achieve Moscow's strategic goals, question the integrity of—and undermine public faith in—Western governments and institutions, sow discord, stoke fear and anxiety, and weaken cohesion in Western societies. (S)

[] reporting examples – Russia:

- Since the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian officials have attempted to influence Canadians by (i) casting doubt on the Western narrative on the war; (ii) denouncing and discrediting the GC's support to Ukraine and activities of Ukraine; and, (iii) distracting public opinion from other Russian actions, []

[]

- []

- []

- []

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET/ [] CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

Pakistan:

[] Pakistan's FI strategy in Canada is to promote stability in Pakistan and counter India's growing influence. []

26. Pakistan poses an FI threat to the integrity of Canada's political system and democratic institutions through its attempts to target and influence the GC and Canadian fundamental institutions (CFIs)—including [] MPs and public servants—towards pro-Government of Pakistan (GoP) positions and policies. (S//CEO)

[] Pakistan's FI strategy going forward will likely be influenced by the ongoing political, security and economic challenges facing Pakistan. []

2019 CSIS Threat Reduction Measure

CSIS has undertaken a Threat Reduction Measure in order to reduce GoP's FI activities related to Canada's democratic processes.

[] reporting examples – **Pakistan:**

- []
- []

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET/ [] CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

Non-State Actors:

28. Non-state cyber threat actors are of increasing concern as they have developed measurable capabilities in conducting a broad range of threat activities, including election meddling, hacking, sabotage and automated cognitive warfare across social media platforms to manipulate public opinion. SITE assesses that the types of service offered by non-state actors, such as influence-for-hire, can be leveraged by foreign state actors or other non-state actors for threat-related activities. (S)

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

SITE TF will continue to monitor and provide updates on activities relating to FI threats to Canadian democratic institutions.
(U)

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

TOP SECRET// CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024


THIS INFORMATION IS SHARED WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY AND MAY NOT BE USED IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RECLASSIFIED, DISSEMINATED OR DISCLOSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART WITHOUT THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF CSIS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A RECORD WHICH MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT OR PRIVACY ACT OR UNDER APPLICABLE PROVINCIAL OR TERRITORIAL LEGISLATION. IF A REQUEST FOR ACCESS UNDER THESE ACTS IS MADE, THE RECEIVING AGENCY MUST CONSULT CSIS IN RELATION TO APPLYING THE AVAILABLE EXEMPTIONS. FURTHER, CSIS MAY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS UNDER SECTION 38 OF THE CANADA EVIDENCE ACT OR OTHER LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THIS INFORMATION. IF YOU LEARN THAT THIS INFORMATION HAS OR MAY BE DISCLOSED, THAT THESE CAVEATS HAVE NOT BEEN RESPECTED OR IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ABIDE BY THESE CAVEATS, INFORM CSIS IMMEDIATELY.

WARNING: (U) THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY. IT MAY BE USED TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS, BUT RECIPIENTS MAY NOT TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION ON OR SANITIZE ANY PORTION OF THIS REPORT OR ANY INFORMATION DERIVED FROM IT, WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THIS REPORT, OR ANY PART THEREOF, MAY NOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS, SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. ANY REPRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, OR COMMUNICATION (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ORAL BRIEFINGS) OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT OF THESE RESTRICTIONS.

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY



SITE TF SITREP: 13 February 2024

2024 Federal By-Elections

This situation report (SITREP) provides information on the operations of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force. It is to be used by Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs) and Deputy Ministers (DMs) for information and decision-making purposes. Intended for named recipients only. Please share with members of: SITE TF ADMs; SITE TF DMs; DMCIR.

Threat Updates

- (U) No significant updates at this time.
- (S//CEO) New Publication: *SITE Threat Assessment of Foreign Interference Threats To Canadian Democratic Institutions – 2024* (can be viewed on)

Operational Responses and Updates

- (U) No significant updates at this time.

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be altered, distributed beyond its intended audience, produced, reproduced or published, in whole or in any substantial part thereof, without the express permission of CSIS, given its role as SITE TF Chair in 2023.

The word "Canada" in a stylized serif font, with a small red maple leaf icon above the letter 'a'.

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

FEBRUARY 2024

SITE TF

BASELINE THREAT ASSESSMENT – MARCH 4, 2024, DURHAM BY-ELECTION

Baseline Threat Assessment March 4, 2024, Durham By-Election

Background

1. SITE is providing a baseline threat assessment on foreign interference (FI) threats to the March 4, 2024, by-election in the electoral district of Durham. This assessment focusses on the FI threat from the most significant threat actors known to engage in FI in Canada: the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and [REDACTED]. SITE is actively monitoring signs of these or other foreign states or state actors engaging in FI activities around this by-election, or any threats of violent extremism directed at the March 4, 2024, by-election. The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE TF) will report any developments through SITE TF's weekly Situational Report. (S//CEO)



Foreign Interference Threat Overview

2. Sophisticated, pervasive and persistent FI activities constitute a serious threat for Canada's national security and the integrity of Canada's democratic institutions. For certain foreign states, FI activities are part of their normal pattern of behaviour in Canada and can increase during election periods. Foreign states can use FI activities to influence Canadian politics by (i) deceptively supporting individuals who are perceived to be receptive to foreign state interests and, (ii) opposing individuals who are perceived to be against these foreign states. To accomplish their goals, threat actors exploit loopholes in political party nomination processes; engage in money and financing operations; mobilize and leverage community organizations; manipulate media outlets—including social media—and, engage in cyber threat activity. (S//CEO)

3. Many threat actors leverage Canadian diaspora populations as a voting bloc during election periods in an attempt to try and shape electoral outcomes. While this is not the only FI tool available to these threat actors, it is a particularly powerful tool in electoral districts with large Canadian diaspora populations. (S//CEO)

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

Key Threat Actors

People's Republic of China (PRC)

4. Based on currently available intelligence and historical PRC behaviour in past by-elections, [redacted]
[redacted] (S//CEO)

- i. [redacted]
- ii. [redacted]
- iii. [redacted]

5. PRC-linked actors have recently used disinformation campaigns to accuse Canadian MPs and other political figures of criminal and ethical violations. [redacted]
[redacted]

India

[redacted]

Russia

[redacted]

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

[Redacted]

Pakistan

[Redacted]

Iran

[Redacted]

Irrelevant

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Irrelevant

Irrelevant

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY
FEBRUARY 2024

Irrelevant

Outlook


SITE will continue to actively monitor for any indications of FI by foreign states or state actors, in addition to any threats of violent extremism relating to the Durham by-election. SITE will report any developments through SITE TF's weekly Situational Report. (S//CEO)

THIS INFORMATION IS SHARED WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY AND MAY NOT BE USED IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RECLASSIFIED, DISSEMINATED OR DISCLOSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART WITHOUT THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF CSIS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A RECORD WHICH MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT OR PRIVACY ACT OR UNDER APPLICABLE PROVINCIAL OR TERRITORIAL LEGISLATION. IF A REQUEST FOR ACCESS UNDER THESE ACTS IS MADE, THE RECEIVING AGENCY MUST CONSULT CSIS IN RELATION TO APPLYING THE AVAILABLE EXEMPTIONS. FURTHER, CSIS MAY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS UNDER SECTION 38 OF THE CANADA EVIDENCE ACT OR OTHER LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THIS INFORMATION. IF YOU LEARN THAT THIS INFORMATION HAS OR MAY BE DISCLOSED, THAT THESE CAVEATS HAVE NOT BEEN RESPECTED OR IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ABIDE BY THESE CAVEATS, INFORM CSIS IMMEDIATELY.

WARNING: (U) THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY. IT MAY BE USED TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS, BUT RECIPIENTS MAY NOT TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION ON OR SANITIZE ANY PORTION OF THIS REPORT OR ANY INFORMATION DERIVED FROM IT, WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THIS REPORT, OR ANY PART THEREOF, MAY NOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS, SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. ANY REPRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, OR COMMUNICATION (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ORAL BRIEFINGS) OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT OF THESE RESTRICTIONS.

For Public Release

Shawn Tupper 02/14/2024



SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SITE TF SITREP: 6 February 2024



2024 Federal By-Elections

This situation report (SITREP) provides information on the operations of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force. It is to be used by Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs) and Deputy Ministers (DMs) for information and decision-making purposes. Intended for named recipients only. Please share with members of: SITE TF ADMs; SITE TF DMs; DMCIR.

Threat Updates

- (S//CEO) SITE has published a report titled *Baseline Threat Assessment: March 4, 2024, Durham By-Election*, which can be viewed in

Operational Responses and Updates

- (S//CEO) The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security is coordinating the activation of a 24/7 Hotline Service, which will provide political parties with centralized support if party or candidate communications, email, or social media accounts are compromised. The 24/7 Hotline Service will be made available to political parties throughout the 2024 by-election period.

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be altered, distributed beyond its intended audience, produced, reproduced or published, in whole or in any substantial part thereof, without the express permission of CSIS, given its role as SITE TF Chair in 2023.

The word "Canada" in a stylized font with a small red maple leaf above the letter 'a'.