

For Public Release

From: [redacted] CSIS Rep/Chair of the SITE TF
Sent: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 15:30:14 +0000
To: [redacted] (PCO-BCP)
Cc: [redacted]; Bo BASLER
Subject: RE: DMCIR Follow-up

Classification: Top Secret/[redacted]/Canadian Eyes Only
Classification: Très secret/[redacted]/Réservé aux Canadiens
Not for PA / Ne pas classer

Hi [redacted] and thanks for following up.
 As requested, please find our remarks, as of yesterday.
 Salutations,

[redacted] CSIS Rep/Chair of the SITE TF

SITE TF Mechanics / Durham by-election:

- The SITE TF agreed to produce a joint baseline assessment for Durham to integrate inputs for all SITE agencies, which was issued on February 6th.
- [redacted] This is the first time that SITE produced a Baseline Threat Assessment product for a by-election encompassing inputs from all SITE agencies. The SITE assessment took into consideration:
 - Any intelligence from SITE agencies indicating whether or not a foreign state had any intent to interfere in the by-election;
 - The diaspora community presence, [redacted]
 - Individuals running in a riding [redacted]
- The other SITE TF product is a Weekly SITREP issued as of noon, on Tuesdays. These reports are published over the [redacted] platform.
- Weekly SITE TF meeting with all SITE members on Monday afternoons permit to collate and assess potential threats that have been detected and could impact the specific riding.

SITE weekly SITREPS rely on inputs from SITE partners:

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- **CSIS'** input is based mandatory weekly inputs from operational areas [redacted]
[redacted], received on
Mondays, CoB;
- **CSE / CCCS:** lookout for any intelligence related to Foreign Interference in its proceedings, to be received on Mondays, CoB. Separately, CCCS relies on its sensors, reported incidents or calls to the hotline to raise any concerns from a cyber-perspective that would need to be included in the weekly SITREP.
- **RCMP:** the Ideologically Motivated Criminal Intelligence Team (IMCIT) maintains visibility over the pre-IMVE space and reports weekly any indication that the by-election, candidates, or relevant topics are resonating in that space, which includes everything from anti-authority to conspiracy groups/networks/milieus.
- **GAC RRM:** GAC monitors the online environment for signs of inauthentic behavior/signs of foreign information manipulation and reports weekly to SITE.

[redacted] PRC, India, Russia, Iran,
Pakistan [redacted]
[redacted]

SITE will continue to actively monitor for any indications of FI by foreign states or state actors as well as any threats of violent extremism relating to the Durham by-election and will report any developments through SITE TF's weekly Situational Reports.

From: [redacted]@pco-bcp.gc.ic.ca>
Sent: February 23, 2024 10:26 AM
To: CSIS Rep/Chair of the SITE TF
Subject: DMCIR Follow-up

Classification: TOP SECRET/ [redacted] CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Hi [redacted]

As promised I am sending you the comments provided during your SITE update to DMCIR on 15 Feb, as I recorded them. I interpreted the comments regarding buzzwords and ambiguous terms as applying to

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both the *SITE Threat Assessment of Foreign Interference Threats to Canadian Democratic Institutions – 2024*, and the *Baseline Threat Assessment – March 4, 2024*.

- The baseline reports were useful documents and, once updated, should be provided to the Panel of 5 (P5).
- The DC/NSIA highlighted the frequent use of buzzwords (e.g. grey zone, powerful) in the reports and encouraged SITE to avoid ambiguous terms, emphasizing a strong preference for precision. In reference to repeated reference to Chinese media manipulation, the DC/NSIA encouraged CSIS to attribute media manipulation to state actors or diaspora groups if possible.
- The DC/NSIA also cautioned against using the term “loopholes” when discussing FI actors’ exploitation of nomination processes.
- [REDACTED]
- The DC/NSIA highlighted the report’s reference to [REDACTED] as it wasn’t discussed with the P5.
- Members discussed SITE related information and assessments written at the operational versus strategic level, and the need for the P5 to be clear on the manner in which these different assessments are written. The DC/NSIA added that we need to be conscious of how reports are written, and be explicit in how newly discovered information is reflected. The DC/NSIA added that we need to be conscious of how we are writing reports now, and be explicit in how newly discovered information is reflected.

The meeting minutes are going through approvals so there could be additional changes, but I am confident this reflects the majority of edits/updates requested.

Would you mind providing me with your remarks from yesterday’s (22 Feb) update? I will pull from this for the meeting minutes.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary
Intelligence Assessment Secretariat

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sender / Envoyeur : [CSIS Rep/Chair of the SITE TF](#)

Recipients / Receveurs : [REDACTED]

Subject / Sujet : RE: DMCIR Follow-up

Date : 2/23/2024 10:30:13 AM