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Diplomatic Notes

There have been four diplomatic notes sent to the Chinese embassy in Ottawa on the issue of Foreign Interference since Fall 2021.

1)

2) **October 28, 2022:** diplomatic note on overseas police stations, requesting that these be shut down, [redacted] and reminding the Chinese embassy of obligations under the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and Consular relations (VCDR/VCCR).

3) **February 24, 2023:** diplomatic note on overseas police stations, [redacted] and reminding embassy of the importance of abiding by the VCDR/VCCR.

4)

Diplomatic representations / engagement with the PRC Embassy

Different streams/branches of Global Affairs Canada regularly engage with the PRC Embassy through calls, démarches, and letters at various levels for a wide array of day-to-day business. For instance, the Asia Branch frequently speaks with officials from the Embassy on various topics, including the state of bilateral relations, international defence and security issues, visits, culture, diplomatic visas, education, consular, embassy security, or trade/commercial matters.

The issue of foreign interference, surveillance, and issues involving the security of Canada have been raised on multiple occasions and at various levels by GAC officials since October 2021. Importantly, the issue was **raised on 17 January 2022** by then-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Marta Morgan, directly to her counterpart Vice Minister Xie Feng.

Overall, there were **31 representations** at all levels (through diplomatic channels) on the issue of foreign interference, surveillance, and issues involving the security of Canada. **25 were made by Headquarters** (including at the highest levels) and **6 in Beijing**. Breakdown and details as follows:

By Headquarters

- 14 December 2021: OGM to Ambassador Cong (Chinese interference in the context of Canada's upcoming decision on 5G technology)
- **17 January 2022: then-USS Morgan with then-VM Xie Feng (foreign interference and explicitly raised concerns about the activities of the United Front Work Department in Canada).**


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- 8 July 2022: MINA meeting with then-counterpart Wang Yi on margins of G20 FMM in Bali. Raised Chinese coercive behaviour.
- 15 August 2022: Bilateral Political Consultations: OPB/Chen with MFA DDG/Yao (foreign interference issues, including UFWD and OCAO)
- **31 August 2022: DMA dinner with Ambassador Cong (foreign interference issues)**
- **1 September 2022: Note Verbale delivered on intimidation of Canadians, interference in internal and legislative process.**
- 12 Sept. 2022 – A/OPD Call with DCM Zhao (foreign interference issues)
- **7 October 2022: OGM to Ambassador Cong (police stations)**
- **28 October 2022: OGM to Ambassador Cong in-person (police stations), delivery of Note Verbale,** [redacted]
- 4 November 2022: OGM to Ambassador Cong (police stations)
- 11 Nov 2022: OPB to DCM Zhao (police stations)
- 15 November 2022: OGM to Ambassador Cong (police stations)
- **15 November 2022: PM Trudeau publicly raises concerns about foreign interference and police stations directly to President Xi, G20 Summit (Bali, Indonesia)**
- 15 November 2022: MINA informal meeting with then-counterpart Wang Yi at G20 Summit. Raised foreign interference directly.
- 28 November 2022: OGM to Ambassador Cong (police stations)
- 1 December, 2022: OPD to DCM Zhao (police stations and foreign interference)
- 22 December, 2022: OPB to DCM Zhao (police stations)
- 23 December 2022: OGM to Ambassador Cong (police stations)
- 1 February 2023: OPB to DCM Zhao (foreign interference)
- **2 February 2023: DMA to Ambassador Cong in-person– Démarche on intrusion of surveillance balloon in North American airspace. DMA also references other unacceptable behaviours by Chinese authorities, including interference, police stations, and malign cyber activities.**
- 21 February 2023: OPB to DCM Zhao (foreign interference and surveillance balloon), [redacted]
- **24 February 2023: aOGM to Ambassador Cong (police stations and foreign interference)** [redacted] **delivery of second Note Verbale on police stations.**
- **2 March 2023: MINA raised foreign interference in pull-aside with Chinese counterpart Qin Gang at the G20 FMM in New Delhi.**

Beijing:

- 3 November 2022: DHOM [redacted] (as Chargée d'affaires) meeting with MFA DDG (police stations)
- 9 November 2022: DHOM [redacted] meeting with MFA DDG (police stations)
- **15 November 2022: Ambassador May presentation of credentials to MFA DDG Ms. Wang Min (police stations and foreign interference)**
- 16 November 2022 DHOM [redacted] Meeting with Deputy DG MFA Wang Min (police stations)
- **29 November 2022: Ambassador May introductory call with MFA DG Yang Tao (police stations and foreign interference)**
- 1 December 2022: Counsellor Adler meeting with Director for North America (police stations)

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**Diplomatic representation****In capitals:**

- No. of **Canadian** diplomats at Embassy in Beijing: **71**;
- No. of **Chinese** diplomats at Embassy in Ottawa: **72**;

Network:

- Chinese diplomatic footprint in Canada (incl. ICAO): 181. Chinese embassy in Ottawa: 72; Consulate General in Toronto: 38; Consulate General in Vancouver: 25; Consulate General in Montréal: 22; Consulate General in Calgary: 19; ICAO: 5.
- Canadian diplomatic footprint in China: 148. Canadian embassy in Beijing: 81 positions (of which 71 staffed); CHONQ: 5; GANZU: 15; SHNGI: 23; HKONG: 23.

Note: Chinese footprint is diplomats registered with the Protocol Office in Ottawa. Canadian footprint is based on number of positions allocated, but excludes Temporary Duty officials. Positions allocated are higher than positions staffed due to officials not occupying their positions for reasons such as visas or COVID restrictions.

Note 2: The above numbers on diplomatic representation as well as numbers provided previously about diplomatic representation in the note titled "23. Diplomatic Representation in Canada / in China" are publicly available but difficult to compile. There would be no concerns about MINA stating the numbers for China and Canada during the appearance. The other numbers provided, such as those for the UK diplomatic presence or that of Japan, while publicly available, may cause discomfort to our partners if they are used by the Minister during the appearance, but may be used with caution on a responsive basis should they be required to illustrate a point. They would have to be released under proactive disclosure, however, as they are publicly available.