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Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference
in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions

Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère
dans les processus électoraux et les
institutions démocratiques fédéraux

In Camera Examination Summary: Ms. Katie Telford, Mr. Jeremy Broadhurst, Mr. Brian Clow, Mr. Patrick Travers

Ms. Katie Telford, Mr. Jeremy Broadhurst, Mr. Brian Clow, and Mr. Patrick Travers were examined by Commission counsel during in camera hearings held between February 28 and March 6, 2024. Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada appeared on behalf of the Government of Canada and had the opportunity to examine the witnesses. The hearing was held in the absence of the public and other Participants.

Notes to Reader

- Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.
- This summary has been prepared pursuant to subclause (a)(iii)(C)(II) of the Commission's Terms of Reference. It discloses the evidence pertinent to clauses (a)(i)(A) and (B) of the Commission's Terms of Reference that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.
- This summary contains information that relates to the Commission's mandate under clauses (a)(i)(A) and (B) of its Terms of Reference. Information provided during the examination that relates to other aspects of the Commission's Terms of Reference has been omitted from this summary, but may be adduced by the Commission at a later stage of its proceedings.
- This summary should be read with the Institutional Reports prepared by the **Prime Minister's Office ("PMO")**.

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1. Examination by Commission Counsel

- [1] Ms. Telford, Mr. Broadhurst, Mr. Clow, and Mr. Travers confirmed the accuracy of the classified summary of the interview that Commission Counsel conducted with them on February 21, 2024. They adopted the classified version as part of their evidence before the Commission.
- [2] Ms. Telford explained that she had been Chief of Staff since 2015, except for the two election writ periods for which she took an unpaid leave from government. Mr. Clow has been the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister since 2021. Before that, he was the Executive Director of Issues Management, Parliamentary Affairs, Canada/U.S. relations between 2019-2021. When he joined the Prime Minister's office in 2017, he was solely focused on Canada/U.S. relations.
- [3] From 2016 until the fall 2020, Mr. Travers was a policy advisor in the PMO policy team working on foreign policy issues. From fall 2020 onwards, he was Senior Global Affairs Advisor with responsibility for international files in the office and was running the international team.
- [4] Mr. Broadhurst testified that at the start of 2019, he was Chief of Staff to Chrystia Freeland, who was then the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He took a leave of absence in the spring of that year through to the fall to become the National Campaign Director of the Liberal Party of Canada in the election of 2019. After that campaign, he was once again Chief of Staff to Chrystia Freeland. She then moved on to become Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intergovernmental affairs. In August 2020, she retained the title of Deputy Prime Minister and became Minister of Finance. Mr. Broadhurst took a leave of absence for the 2021 election campaign where he was a senior advisor. Following the 2021 campaign, he went to the Prime Minister's Office as a senior advisor. In October 2023, he has taken another leave of absence to return to the party as National Campaign Director for the next election campaign, whenever it may be.

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1.1 Flow of Intelligence to the PMO

- [5] Ms. Telford explained that while there is no single mechanism through which intelligence is brought to the PMO, it always comes through the **Privy Council Office (“PCO”)**. **The Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”)** does not receive intelligence directly from any of the departments, unless the PCO were to bring in someone from a different department to join them for a brief. Ms. Telford said that all of her inputs from the intelligence or security world was coming via Privy Council.
- [6] Ms. Telford explained that over the years, the flow has changed and evolved. Partly, it’s been different depending on who is the **National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (“NSIA”)**. She explained that it was different in different time periods. During the pandemic period everything changed for everyone. After the media leaks started, things changed again.
- [7] Ms. Telford said that they used to (in the pre-pandemic period) receive daily brief documents on a semi-regular basis. Daily briefs and weekly intelligence briefs were available to them. If they were on the road, they wouldn’t receive them. Sometimes it was easier to just look at the weekly brief documents, which often summed up what was in the daily brief. There would also be briefings, with the subject matter depending on what was going on in the world at the time. Ms. Telford recalls receiving briefings, for example: when the two Michaels were arbitrarily detained, they would receive briefings on what was going on with them between the Chinese and Canadian governments; when PS752 was shot down, they received briefings around the related intelligence; they also received briefings on Ukraine.
- [8] They received the daily and weekly written brief documents from the PCO, which Ms. Telford could review whenever she was in the appropriate place to review them. The daily briefs were two-sided, one piece of paper. The weekly would sometimes be two pages, double-sided; a short summary of what’s going on in the world. Some of the information was open source. It wasn’t just intelligence. It was just giving a sort of summary of what’s going on in the world that week. Sometimes it would draw on intelligence, sometimes not. They would see that information while in the office in a cleared environment. Ms. Telford said that sometimes she would catch up many weeks later after travelling, for instance.

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Other times, she couldn't do that and she would just start reading the current documents and rely on the senior officials to tell her if there was something she needed to know.

- [9] During the pandemic, everything shut down at a certain point. They had secure telephones that were appropriate for discussions up to the Secret Level (not Top-Secret Level), which allowed for a certain degree of communication. They did not have secure screens (Secret Level) until well into the pandemic. The PMO staff were given access to secure screens that allowed them to view classified documents in or around February.
- [10] Ms. Telford could remember that there were **Client Relations Officers (CROs)** who would come to her house the odd time and they would sit at a distance from her while she reviewed documents in her living room. Then they would leave and take the documents with them. It was fairly rare for them to go to that point. In the first couple of months, and over time when there were not complete lockdowns in place, Ms. Telford would also go into the office.
- [11] The witnesses saw less intelligence, and relied more heavily on senior officials to bring topical issues to their attention. They all tried to work from home during that period as much as possible. Ms. Telford indicated that this lasted well into 2021. Mr. Clow added that from there were periods from the start of the pandemic until early 2022 when no one came into the office both because of the pandemic and the convoy protests that blocked access to the building. Ms. Telford explained that secure meetings had to be held outside the regular locations during the convoy protests.
- [12] The witnesses agreed that after the leaks Jody Thomas, the NSIA during this period, implemented a more rigorous system for tracking who had seen what intelligence products. Ms. Telford did not start to receive the daily and weekly briefs again. A CRO travels with them now, which is also different than in the past, so that they can see classified information on the road. In addition, on a weekly basis, a CRO comes into the office to provide Ms. Telford with a reading package. The CRO tracks what Ms. Telford reads. Ms. Telford said that there are usually notes for her within the package directing her attention to certain documents from the NSIA or a member of the PMO staff. If there is something urgent that the NSIA wants Ms. Telford to see, she will find Ms. Telford, or

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have someone find her and either bring the information to her or ask her to attend a SCIF. The NSIA is Ms. Telford's main contact.

- [13] Mr. Clow said that while the paper flow is important, when officials want them to know something, or want the Prime Minister to know something, officials cause a briefing to happen, by calling them or coming to see them. The most important information is not transmitted through paper.
- [14] Ms. Telford said she receives a lot more intelligence now than before the pandemic, in particular raw intelligence. She said the folder she is handed now is full of raw intelligence. The only raw intelligence she consumed in earlier years was if the NSIA brought it to her attention. She attributed this change to the various critical global events for which intelligence is required on an ongoing and immediate basis.
- [15] Mr. Travers testified that the way they accessed intelligence and what they see had changed, as Ms. Telford described. He added that the distinction between undirected reading that is for background information, and senior officials, particularly the NSIA, flagging things that were urgent or require particular attention, holds throughout the period. He noted that if something was particularly important, it was flagged distinctly by officials, and that had been true since 2016.

1.2 Flow of Intelligence to the PM

- [16] Ms. Telford explained that she might receive intelligence in advance of it going to the Prime Minister in two scenarios. First, if Ms. Telford receives something ahead of him she might be the one to tell him. Second, she would sometimes see something and tell either the NSIA or the Prime Minister that she had learned something and asked for them to brief on it. Usually, that was something where the NSIA had already intended to do so. Ms. Telford viewed some of her briefings as a "pre-brief" to the Prime Minister's briefing, because it gave the briefing agency a sense of some of the questions that he might ask and push on so that they were fully ready when they met him.
- [17] Ms. Telford views herself as having two hats in the office. One is managing the Prime Minister's office writ large; the other is being his senior-most political advisor. The NSIA is very much not a part of the PM's office, they are not exempt staff, they are career public

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services but who are a direct report to the PM. They have direct access and ability to reach the PM if and when they need to and want to, and they give direct recommendations and advice to the PM, alongside the Clerk at the PCO, who has that same direct reporting relationship and ability to reach and access the PM as needed. Ms. Telford said that those individuals would often come to them and check in with them on something as written as kind of a preliminary run. If something was urgent, they would indicate that they needed to see the PM immediately. They have direct access to him without any problems where there is a need. For instance, the Clerk can call switchboard and be put through the PM at any time, and has.

[18] When asked about changes in communication or information flow based on individual NSIAs, Ms. Telford said that events and experience are the two things that are the primary factors that might change and influence how things have run over time. Different world events over time have caused different reactions. The NSIA's background is also relevant. They each bring different professional experiences to inform how they come at the role. They had different management style and different experiences.

[19] The PM changed the title of the National Security Advisor to National Security and Intelligence Advisor. Ms. Telford stated that PM believed the latter title was more reflective of the role. It is an important distinction. If you look at the American system where there is an NSA, there is also a Director of National intelligence. Our NSIA interacts with both of those environments and so it is helpful from that perspective to clarify the title.

1.3 Challenge Function

[20] Ms. Telford noted that the CSIS Director once told her that CSIS does not always have the political knowledge that would be helpful when looking at certain electoral processes and is trying to grow its knowledge. She described the PMO as having a challenge function with respect to intelligence, particularly in the context of political processes and norms that might be opaque to the intelligence community. Ms. Telford explained that her office has seen mistakes in intelligence products, including reports on alleged events that had not, in fact, occurred. Ms. Telford recalled discussing this issue with the CSIS Director, David Vigneault, who explained to her that it is important to not correct mistaken

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raw intelligence as incorrect information could be useful to the extent that it sheds light on the reliability or motivation of the source.

[21] Mr. Broadhurst noted that obvious errors in intelligence reinforced healthy skepticism about the accuracy of subsequent intelligence. He added that in politics if you want to find something bad about somebody, it is easy to tell a bad story and he wanted to be sure that somebody's political career was not being destroyed due to something that was the norm in the political realm.

[22] Ms. Telford explained that there is a need to distinguish FI from usual political practice and from legitimate diplomatic activities. It can be expected, for example, for MPs to have contact with certain foreign officials. In recalling a specific briefing about this type of behavior, she added that from her perspective, this was a very common event and did not meet the definition of interference as it was entirely overt.

[23] Ms. Telford explained that discussions with intelligence agencies often occur in the context of obtaining security clearances for MPs who may be appointed to Cabinet or given Parliamentary Secretary positions, but are flagged as security concerns by the intelligence community. The individual subject to allegations is rarely informed. Ms. Telford explained that in the face of these types of allegations, a politician's career can be stalled. While she noted her immense faith in the expertise and experience of the NSIA and the Clerk, she considers it her role to challenge allegations raised by the intelligence community on behalf of the implicated official because she is the only one in a position to do so. Ms. Telford recalled that, an intelligence agency had mistakenly identified a threat linked to an MP. After requesting further verification of the information, the intelligence agency realized its mistake and reversed its assessment. Ms. Telford maintained that had she not pressed for more information, this person's political career would have been stalled without valid reason. Ultimately, however, Ms. Telford cannot think of a time where she did not defer to the experts and senior officials on questions of security clearance.

1.4 Election Periods

[24] Mr. Travers explained that PMO is scaled down during the caretaker period, during which most staff members take unpaid leaves and their roles are deputized. They operate

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according to the caretaker function because government activity continues during the election. Mr. Travers explained that one of the reasons he would stay behind particularly is that the world continues during elections, and there is a need to deal with any crises that emerge or to brief the Prime Minister in his capacity as Prime Minister should there be any concerns. The caretaker PMO works very closely with PCO much in a similar way but under the caretaker convention.

[25] Mr. Travers has had the role of remaining at PMO during the caretaker period during the 2019 and 2021 elections. The purpose of remaining at PMO is to maintain support for the PM in his management of ongoing issues, and to deal with any crises. He worked closely with PCO during the caretaker period.

1.4.1 2019 Election – Issue 1, Don Valley North

[26] Mr. Broadhurst explained ahead of the 2019 election, the government created a mechanism to inform political parties of any Foreign Interference (FI) that might affect them. Mr. Broadhurst had Top Secret security clearance and two other members of the Liberal Party of Canada (“LPC”) had Secret clearance.

[27] Mr. Broadhurst remembered being informed of a CSIS briefing to the cleared LPC representatives in the weeks before the election. The cleared representative told Mr. Broadhurst that the briefing provided an overview of allegations that there were irregularities in the Don Valley North nomination contest, which was the contest resulting in the nomination of Han Dong. They were told that there may have been PRC FI in the nomination process. As a result of this information, Mr. Broadhurst contacted senior civil servants to seek more information on these allegations and the intelligence. There was no confirmation that the candidate had any involvement in or awareness of any activity. Mr. Broadhurst further explained that CSIS did not recommend that the LPC take any measures as a result of the intelligence. Mr. Broadhurst also determined that the LPC campaign staff and volunteers within the Don Valley North riding had not raised any concerns, nor had the losing contestant in the nomination contest complained about the result through the LPC’s internal dispute resolution process.

[28] Mr. Broadhurst recalled that one of the alleged irregularities concerned the presence of busses of Chinese speaking individuals. Without evidence of foreign orchestration behind

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the busses, this was not alarming. Bussing is an expected part of any nomination campaign; the objective is to make voting as easy as possible for party members. Ms. Telford added that the allegations of inappropriate bussing suggested that the intelligence agencies might not have a comprehensive understanding of the political nominations process.

- [29] Mr. Broadhurst described the LPC nomination monitoring process, including the fact that only those individuals registered as members of the LPC before the meeting date is set are eligible to vote. A person does not need to be a Canadian citizen to vote in a nomination race. Mr. Broadhurst opined that from a public policy standpoint, it is better to engage with a group that is larger than just citizens. He noted that there is no statistical evidence that a non-citizen is more likely than a citizen to be influenced by a foreign state.
- [30] People's eligibility to vote can be challenged. Mr. Broadhurst noted that since this was a competitive nomination race, with two experienced candidates, it would not have been unusual for the losing party to have raised a complaint or presented a challenge to the results if they believed were irregularities. As stated above, no such complaints were raised in Don Valley North.
- [31] Mr. Broadhurst considered it appropriate to inform the PM of these allegations. The next time the PM was in Ottawa, about two days after the initial briefing on the DVN irregularities, Mr. Broadhurst briefed the PM on the issue. Mr. Broadhurst recommended to the PM that it was not appropriate to overturn the results of a democratic process because there was no evidence to support the alleged irregularities, and it was not possible to disclose the allegations publicly.
- [32] Mr. Broadhurst testified that as National Campaign Director for the LPC, he was heavily involved in addressing the personal matters that led to Geng Tan's decision to resign as MPP from the Don Valley North riding ahead of the 2019 election.
- [33] Mr. Broadhurst was asked whether it was possible to assess whether Han Dong had been considered more likely to win a nomination race. Mr. Broadhurst explained that there is no formal system to identify which candidate might be the anticipated favourite in a nomination process. However, the party can know how many LPC members are registering to participate in nomination races as a result of a particular candidate's

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campaign. Mr. Broadhurst emphasized that this is not necessarily an indication of who they will ultimately vote for but it does provide some insight into who might be the preferred candidate. Mr. Broadhurst testified that Mr. Dong may have had better name recognition because he was a sitting MPP and that the LPC considered him to be a slight favourite.

1.4.2. 2019 Other Issues

- [34] The witnesses were asked a series of questions asking if they were, at the time, of a number of alleged incidents of FI in the 2019 election, including alleged foreign interference by Pakistan.
- [35] The witness were not aware of the alleged interference nor the threat reduction measure conducted in advance of the 2019 election to reduce the FI threat posed by the Government of Pakistan.
- [36] They testified that they were also not aware of alleged FI activities by PRC officials related to the 2019 election. They learned about these allegations for the first time when they were reported in the media in November 2022.
- [37] In addition, the witnesses were not aware of allegations that the PRC may have been involved in the covert transfer of funds ahead of the 2019 election.
- [38] Mr. Travers responded to a question about a briefing to the Prime Minister on foreign interference in February 2021. He replied that it was not unusual at that time for the PM to receive thematic briefings on national security issues of interest. He recalled that the briefing provided a broad update on the status of foreign interference and included discussions of a number of different countries and a number of different tactics. It was a wide-ranging discussion that also mentioned information bots and disinformation and other specific examples of foreign interference.

1.4.3. 2021 Election

- [39] Mr. Broadhurst explained that ahead of the 2021 election, cleared LPC representatives were briefed on an FI matter. This briefing was provided to the Party “for information only”. After the briefing, Mr. Broadhurst asked PCO for additional information on the allegations.

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[40] Mr. Broadhurst noted that, at the time he received the information, the PM was not going to be in Ottawa again until after the election. Mr. Broadhurst decided not to brief the PM on the allegations before the election because he did not believe there any action to be taken. The PM was ultimately briefed after the election. The Clerk attended that briefing.

1.4.4. 2021 Election – Other Issues

[41] The witnesses testified that they did not hear about allegations of a foreign disinformation campaign targeting the Conservative Party of Canada (“CPC”) and more specifically Kenny Chiu until after the election. They further testified to being unaware of a PRC preference for the LPC. It would have been surprising to them to learn that the PRC favoured the LPC given that relations with China were very fraught and given the Government’s global campaign promoting opposition to China’s arbitrary detention of the two Michaels that had been going on for the previous two years.

[42] Mr. Clow noted that there were legitimate political reasons for the seats that the Conservatives lost in 2021, particularly in York Region and Vancouver, including Kenny Chiu’s riding. He cited the regulation of firearms as an issue of concern amongst the Chinese-Canadian community that could have swayed the voters towards the LPC candidates. He also believed that Chinese-Canadian communities supported LPC position in terms of COVID protocols.

[43] Mr. Broadhurst added that the rhetoric of the CPC with respect to China under Erin O’Toole had shifted and included not just an anti-Beijing Government tone, but also an anti-China tone. He confirmed that the LPC monitors voter response to party positions through monitoring social media, knocking on doors and making phone calls. They detected that the shift in CPC position was picked up by the community and was turning voters off. He was aware of a lot of social commentary from Chinese-Canadians about the CPC abandoning or playing politics with the community. Mr. Broadhurst believed that this combined with the firearms issue made it natural that a seat like Mr. Chiu’s had become fertile ground for the LPC. As a result, Mr. Broadhurst claimed that the LPC put additional resources into Mr. Chiu’s riding. Mr. Clow reminded that the LPC had won Chiu’s seat in 2015, so the seat should be viewed as a swing seat, where an LPC win is not surprising.

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[44] None of the witnesses were aware of allegations of covert financial support by a foreign country for candidates ahead of the 2021 election.

2. Briefings and Memoranda

2.1 Memorandum for the Prime Minister, People's Republic of China

Political Interference in Canada, PCO, June 29, 2017

[45] [The document contains high-level information about (1) PRC political interference activities in Canada and elsewhere; (2) advice from the NSIA, including a recommendation to undertake efforts to improve awareness that MPs could be targets of FI; and (3) the fact that public efforts to raise awareness should remain general and not single out specific incidents, to avoid potential bilateral incidents].

[46] Mr. Clow was aware of this document because the Global News team asked the PMO about it around the time several documents were leaked to the media.

[47] While Ms. Telford did not have a specific recollection of the document, she said that the contents reflected the advice generally given by PCO at the time. She mentioned specifically the memo's recommendation that MPs be briefed on potential risks involved in international travel. Such briefings were delivered, including in advance of the trip to India in 2018.

2.1.1 Briefing February 9, 2021

[48] Mr. Travers attended this briefing to the PM by CSIS Director Vigneault. He described it as a broad update on FI, including a description of some of the countries interested in Canada and their tactics. Mr. Travers did not receive any written documentation in connection with the briefing.

2.1.2 Intelligence Assessment May 2022

[49] The witnesses were not aware of an alleged disinformation campaign aimed at the CPC during the 2021 election campaign.

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2.1.3 Meeting September 28, 2022

[50] During this meeting, Mr. Clow confirmed that the NSIA and the CSIS Director briefed himself, Patrick Travers and the PS Chief of Staff about an upcoming business community meeting with a few MPs where a foreign official would also be present. CSIS advised they had either planned to, or had already, spoken to the MPs, to warn them to be careful about these types of meetings. Further, the NSIA and CSIS Director also provided an overview of several additional FI-related matters. Mr. Clow recalled there were no recommendations and characterized this conversation as “for information only” to keep the PMO staff apprised of the agencies’ work.

[51] Mr. Clow stated that the PM was briefed along the same lines on October 27, 2022. Additional countries were mentioned.

2.1.4 Meeting October 27 2022

[52] Ms. Telford remembered discussing at this meeting the idea that to gain favour with their superiors, foreign diplomatic officials might brag about actions they had taken to influence Canadian democratic processes. She remembers being told that a foreign official bragging about a certain action did not necessarily mean that they had done what they bragged about.

2.1.5 Meeting November 30, 2022

[53] Mr. Clow remembered this meeting took place just before the PM attended the first House of Commons Question Period after the media leaks. PMO wanted to determine how accurate the media reporting was, and made an effort to do so, with the assistance of intelligence agencies. He suggested it was unlikely that the content of the NSIA Memo of the same date to the PM would have been discussed at this meeting.

2.1.6 Meeting January 18/19 2023

[54] Mr. Clow confirmed he attended a meeting on January 18th or 19th 2023. This meeting was a planning meeting with PMO staff for a Cabinet retreat occurring in Hamilton a few days later. Mr. Clow could not remember if the PM attended. He also remembered discussing the “11 candidates” during this meeting because the PMO had no knowledge of the allegation before the media leaks.

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[55] Mr. Clow's meeting notes referenced a "Peter", which he believed was likely in reference to Peter Wilkinson, Minister Joly's chief of staff.

2.1.7 Meeting February 23, 2023

[56] This February 23, 2023 meeting took place in the context of ongoing leaks and media reporting around FI. Mr. Clow said that no new information presented at this meeting, but remembered a discussion about what CSIS was doing in response. He recalled CSIS provided an update on threat reduction measures that had been taken. The participants also discussed whether CSIS should provide advice about elected officials when it provides its briefings. Mr. Vigneault said during the briefing that he did not give advice or make a recommendation on a candidate in the middle of an election campaign and never would have. Mr. Broadhurst remembered discussing the Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and Elections Canada, which allows CSIS to bring information showing inappropriate involvement of a foreign actor in possible contravention of the Elections Act directly to the Commissioner of Elections to launch an investigation. Mr. Clow also recalled that Jody Thomas, who was the NSIA at the time, said that, in future, the office of the NSIA would do a better job of flagging important intelligence to the PMO. He saw this as an acknowledgement that information flow could be improved and he has subsequently seen the improvement.

2.1.8 Meeting March 20, 2023

[57] Mr. Clow described the March 20, 2023 meeting as similar to the February 23, 2023 meeting. The meeting gave an overview of the response to leaked FI allegations rather than to provide new intelligence to the PM/PMO. They also discussed the media allegations about the PRC distributing \$250 000 to covertly fund candidates.

[58] Mr. Clow remembered Mr. Vigneault talking about a variety of allegations in the media, including that Michael Chan was somehow involved in removing Geng Tan from his seat in the Don Valley North riding.

2.1.9 Meeting March 28, 2023

[59] Mr. Clow testified that a reporter had reached out to him to discuss what they characterized as a "Han Dong transcript." The key allegation highlighted by the media was that Han Dong had asked a Chinese official to delay the release of the Two Michaels.

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Mr. Clow described this reporting as explosive, and not accurately reflective of the intelligence. During the March 28, 2023 meeting, they discussed the underlying intelligence and, among other things, available options to declassify material to allow for a correction of the public record.

3. Examination by Counsel for the witnesses

[60] In answer to a question about an unsigned Memo to the PM dated November 30, 2022, Ms. Telford explained that memos that went to the PM were usually signed and dated, which is one way to distinguish a draft from a final product.

[61] Mr. Broadhurst testified that the Geng Tan issue was referred back to the LPC “green light” process. The “green light” process is the process of internal vetting and open-source investigation before a potential LPC candidate is given the party’s approval. Mr. Broadhurst explained that generally a sitting MP would not have to go through a rigorous “green light” process. However, because of allegations about Mr. Tan’s personal conduct, he was subjected to a process with the “green light” committee that involved multiple exchanges and interviews. Ultimately, Mr. Tan decided to resign.