


**IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN
FEDERAL ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

AFFIDAVIT OF GALLIT DOBNER


I, Gallit Dobner, of the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, AFFIRM THAT:

1. On February 9, 2024, I was interviewed by Counsel to the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (“Commission Counsel”) in my capacity as the former Director General of Human Rights, Freedoms, and Inclusion at Global Affairs Canada, along with Marta Morgan, Cindy Termorshuizen, Philippe Lafortune and Tara Denham.
2. In advance of the Stage 1 public hearings, Commission Counsel prepared a public summary of our interview (the “Unclassified Interview Summary”), which was reviewed for National Security Confidentiality (“NSC”) and which I previously adopted as part of my evidence before the Commission.
3. In advance of the Stage 2 public hearings, Commission Counsel prepared an addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary. This addendum summarizes information provided during our interview that, in Commission Counsel’s view, is relevant to Stage 2 of the Commission’s proceedings.
4. In the course of the NSC review of the addendum, some of the information was removed or summarized in order to protect the disclosure of information that could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.
5. I have reviewed the public version of the addendum, a copy of which is attached as **Exhibit “A”** to this affidavit (the “Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary”).
6. The Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary contains an accurate account of publicly disclosable information that I provided to the Commission. I do not wish to make any changes, additions, or deletions to the Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary. Insofar as the Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary contains information provided by other interview participants, that information is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.
7. I adopt the contents of the Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary ascribed to me as part of my evidence before the Commission.

Affirmed before me in the city of Ottawa
in the Province of Ontario on October 29 2024




Commissioner for Taking Affidavits



Gallit Dobner

Amy Jacqueline Campbell,
a Commissioner, etc., Province of
Ontario, for the Government of Canada,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Development.
Expires November 8, 2026.

Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Gallit Dobner dated October 29, 2024

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Amy Campbell', is written over a horizontal line.

Commissioner for Taking Affidavits

**Amy Jacqueline Campbell,
a Commissioner, etc., Province of
Ontario, for the Government of Canada,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Development.
Expires November 8, 2026.**

UNCLASSIFIED



Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference
in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions

Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère
dans les processus électoraux et les
institutions démocratiques fédéraux

Addendum to Interview Summary: Marta Morgan, Cindy Termorshuizen, Philippe Lafortune, Tara Denham, Gallit Dobner

Marta Morgan, Cindy Termorshuizen, Philippe Lafortune, Tara Denham, and Gallit Dobner were interviewed in a panel format by Commission Counsel on February 9, 2024. The interview was held in a secure environment and included references to classified information. This addendum contains information provided during that interview that is relevant to Stage 2 of the Commission's proceedings and that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

- Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.

1. Definition of foreign interference in the CSIS Act

- [1] Questioned on the potential discrepancy between the definition of foreign interference in the *CSIS Act* and the current terms in use within the Government of Canada, Mr. Lafortune answered that the legislation was enacted in 1984. As a result, the definition does not perfectly reflect today's reality. However, the concept of foreign interference is well understood in practice.

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2. Tools to counter foreign interference

- [2] In reference to a placemat entitled "Countering Foreign Interference: Components of an Effective Response by GAC"¹, Ms. Morgan explained that GAC plays an important role in countering foreign interference, but that the department's role has to be coordinated with the Security and Intelligence ("S&I") Community. GAC relies on the Crown prerogative, as well as on the specific authorities in the *CSIS Act* and the *CSE Act*, to counter foreign interference.
- [3] Ms. Morgan divided the tools at GAC's disposal to counter foreign interference into three categories. The first category concerns the diplomatic responses, which could include public attributions of hostile activities by foreign actors, issuance of demarches, cancelling of high level visits, visa denials, imposition of sanctions and, as a maximal tool, declaring embassy personnel as *persona non grata*. The second category are prevention responses. This category includes, for example, diplomatic and national security elements of the Indo Pacific Strategy, Active Cyber Operations, as well as export restrictions. The third category includes proactive bilateral and multilateral responses. For example, this category includes working in collaboration with the Five Eye alliance, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and multilateral activities, like the US Democracy Summit. She noted that the Indo Pacific Strategy was only put in place in 2023, after the 44th general election.
- [4] The decision regarding which diplomatic measures to deploy in the context of foreign interference depends on a host of factors. Ms. Morgan explained that decisions are based on a whole-of-government approach and depends on the nature of the issue. Other relevant considerations include the impact on bilateral or multilateral relationships, as well as the availability and potential effectiveness of other remedies.

¹ CAN012898.

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3. The Targeting of Michael Chong

- [5] In reference to a 2021 CSIS report regarding PRC officials taking an interest in certain MPs who voted to support the House of Commons motion to recognize the PRC's treatment of religious minorities as genocide, Ms. Morgan explained that she does not specifically recall this report, over two years after it was disseminated. She noted the "river of intelligence" she received at the time. However, she recalls that GAC monitored this issue very closely because the Department was anticipating a negative response from the PRC to this Parliamentary resolution.
- [6] Asked about the considerations that led to the subsequent recommendation to expel Zhao Wei, and more specifically why this measure was not considered earlier, Ms. Morgan said she was not in a position to comment on a decision made after her retirement. However, she explained that in 2021 she had received more than one report, which did not always contain specific names or anything to link them to each other. At that time, no assessment was provided and the intelligence was not seen as actionable.
- [7] Mr. Lafortune was then asked if GAC's Intelligence Bureau produced an assessment of the Zhao Wei situation [Zhao Wei was a PRC official]. Mr. Lafortune noted that assessments by the Intelligence Bureau on Mr. Zhao Wei were made in 2023 to support GAC's policy considerations about his diplomatic status in Canada. According to Mr. Lafortune, in May 2023, GAC's Intelligence Bureau received, from CSIS, additional intelligence reports referencing Zhao Wei, including a report with limited distribution that had been shared previously in 2021, but at that time had not moved beyond the working level at GAC.
- [8] In Mr. Lafortune's view, this intelligence report was not a "smoking gun". Further questioned on why this report did not reach GAC's senior officials in 2021, Mr. Lafortune explained that the problem resided with CSIS's method of dissemination via emails. Mr. Lafortune added that CSIS recently changed its dissemination process. Mr. Lafortune was not able to say with certainty who saw this report in 2021.

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- [9] Regarding the targeting of family members, Ms. Morgan explained that GAC has a toolkit if diplomats are involved. However, the issue falls within the mandate of the national security agencies. On that note, Ms. Denham added that transnational repression is now being looked at closely within the G7 RRM. Ms. Dobner also added that when the G7 recently met in Hiroshima, the Leaders released a statement that included very specific unprecedented language on foreign interference and China.