

**IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN
FEDERAL ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

AFFIDAVIT OF VINCENT RIGBY

I, Vincent Rigby, of the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, AFFIRM THAT:

1. On February 16, 2024, I was interviewed by Counsel to the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (“Commission Counsel”) in my capacity as a former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (“NSIA”), along with David Morrison, Michael MacDonald and Martin Green.
2. In advance of the Stage 1 public hearings, Commission Counsel prepared a public summary of our interview (the “Unclassified Interview Summary”), which was reviewed for National Security Confidentiality (“NSC”) and which I previously adopted as part of my evidence before the Commission.
3. In advance of the Stage 2 public hearings, Commission Counsel prepared an addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary. This addendum summarizes information provided during our interview that, in Commission Counsel’s view, is relevant to Stage 2 of the Commission’s proceedings.
4. In the course of the NSC review of the addendum, some of the information was removed or summarized in order to protect the disclosure of information that could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.
5. I have reviewed the public version of the addendum, a copy of which is attached as **Exhibit “A”** to this affidavit (the “Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary”).
6. The Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary contains an accurate account of publicly disclosable information that I provided to the Commission. I do not wish to make any changes, additions, or deletions to the Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary. Insofar as the Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary contains information provided by other interview participants, that information is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.
7. I adopt the contents of the Addendum to the Unclassified Interview Summary ascribed to me as part of my evidence before the Commission.


8. In March, 2024, I testified *in camera* before the Commission in my capacity as a former NSIA, along with David Morrison, Michael MacDonald and Greta Bossenmaier.
9. In advance of the Stage 1 public hearings, Commission Counsel prepared a public summary of our interview (the “Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary”), which was reviewed for NSC and which I previously adopted as part of my evidence before the Commission.
10. In advance of the Stage 2 public hearings, Commission Counsel prepared an addendum to the Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary. This addendum summarizes information provided during our interview that, in Commission Counsel’s view, is relevant to Stage 2 of the Commission’s proceedings.
11. In the course of the NSC review of the addendum, some of the information was removed or summarized in order to protect the disclosure of information that could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.
12. I have reviewed the public version of the addendum, a copy of which is attached as **Exhibit “B”** to this affidavit (the “Addendum to the Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary”).
13. The Addendum to the Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary contains an accurate account of publicly disclosable information that I provided to the Commission. I do not wish to make any changes, additions, or deletions to the Addendum to the Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary. Insofar as the Addendum to the Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary contains information provided by other interview participants, that information is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.
14. I adopt the contents of the Addendum to the Unclassified *In Camera* Hearing Summary ascribed to me as part of my evidence before the Commission.

Affirmed before me in the city of Chesler
in the Province of Quebec on November 8, 2024


Commissioner for Taking Affidavits


Vincent Rigby

This is **Exhibit "A"** to the affidavit of
Vincent Rigby, affirmed before me
on the 8th of November, 2024



Commissioner for Taking Affidavits

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Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions

Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère
dans les processus électoraux et les
institutions démocratiques fédéraux

Addendum to Interview Summary: Vincent Rigby, David Morrison, Michael MacDonald, Martin Green Interview Summary

Vincent Rigby, David Morrison, Michael MacDonald, and Martin Green were interviewed in a panel format by Commission Counsel on February 16, 2024. The interview was held in a secure environment and included references to classified information. This addendum contains information provided during that interview that is relevant to Stage 2 of the Commission's proceedings and that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

- Text contained [in square brackets] are explanatory notes provided by Commission counsels to assist the reader.

1. Michael Chong

- [1] The witnesses were referred to a 2021 CSIS product describing the PRC's interest in certain Members of Parliament, including the Honourable Michael Chong.
- [2] Mr. Morrison noted that he is familiar with this CSIS product, although not necessarily from the time as he was not NSIA. Mr. Rigby noted certain caveats to the reporting and the language used in the reporting. He stated that a CSIS product like this one would not necessarily set off alarm bells.
- [3] The witnesses were then referred to another 2021 CSIS product that provides further information about PRC activity related to Michael Chong. They were also referred to another 2021 CSIS product that discusses PRC efforts to influence Parliament's Uyghur genocide motion and includes a reference to the activity directed towards ethnic

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Chinese MPs who voted in support of the motion, naming Mr. Chong in that regard. Mr. Morrison and Mr. Rigby could not recall whether they had seen these documents.


- [4] Then, the witnesses were referred to an Intelligence Assessment on PRC FI in Canada, dated July 20, 2021, and was the subject of reporting in Canadian news media. On p. 5, the first bullet discusses, without naming Mr. Chong, the PRC activity directed at Mr. Chong following his involvement in the House of Commons vote on the Uyghur genocide. Upon reviewing the totality of the documents containing direct or indirect reference to Mr. Chong, Commission counsel asked the interviewees who was “tracking the issue” at PCO. Commission counsel also put the proposition to the interviewees that despite the IA not using Mr. Chong’s name, it should have been clear that it referred to Mr. Chong.
- [5] Mr. Morrison stated it was not apparent to him that the IA referred to Mr. Chong. He explained that, because he was not NSIA at the time certain related CSIS products came in, he was not focused on domestic intelligence. Mr. Morrison further explained that IAs are broader-based assessment products and that the specific examples in them are not necessarily intended for immediate action. He explained that, as set out in the second paragraph on page 2 of the document, the document was intended to provide the reader with a baseline understanding of the subject matter of the assessment. He further understood the bullet on p. 5 referred to by Commission counsel to have been included as an illustrative example, and not for action.
- [6] Mr. Morrison provided further clarity on this IA after the interview was complete. Mr. Morrison explained that there would have been no reason for him to connect the July 2021 IA to the earlier CSIS reporting referenced by the Commission. Mr. Morrison explained that when a piece of intelligence comes in that is especially important, time-sensitive, and actionable, it becomes the primary topic of conversation among officials in the intelligence community. It would be the subject of multiple conversations and *ad hoc* meetings, and most likely would be discussed at DM Committee meetings to consider options to address the issue. Mr. Morrison recalled that none of this happened in respect of the Michael Chong intelligence. This was consistent with the fact that intelligence requiring immediate action does not normally come in an IA. Mr. Morrison

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explained that neither he, nor anyone else at PCO was “tracking the issue”, as suggested by Commission counsel, because CSIS had already taken action according to the protocols in place at the time.

- [7] Mr. Rigby advised that he was not in the NSIA role at the time, and could not comment on this IA, but provided further clarity after the interview on responding to intelligence generally. Mr. Rigby explained that officials will often wait to see if subsequent intelligence contains corroborating information that builds the case for action slowly over time. This is especially the case for FI, which is insidious and develops slowly over time.
- [8] Mr. MacDonald added that he would not have connected this IA to the earlier CSIS reporting on Mr. Chong that was referenced by the Commission. He noted he did not remember reading this particular reporting, but would have remembered the names of specific MPs. He noted he has no records of receiving these documents.
- [9] Mr. Green noted that he had seen FI discussed in intelligence reports from the intelligence community before 2021.
- [10] Mr. Rigby added that the NSIA reads thousands of documents each year and that he relied on agencies to flag important information for attention, noting that PCO is not a first line of defence. He does not recall the issue being brought to Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Operational Coordination (DMOC).

This is **Exhibit "B"** to the affidavit of
Vincent Rigby, affirmed before me
on the 8th of November, 2024



Commissioner for Taking Affidavits

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Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference
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Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère
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Addendum to *In Camera* Examination Summary: Former NSIAs: David Morrison, Vincent Rigby, Michael MacDonald, and Greta Bossenmaier

Mr. David Morrison, Mr. Vincent Rigby, Mr. Michael MacDonald and Ms. Greta Bossenmaier were examined by Commission Counsel during *in camera* hearings held between February 28 and March 6, 2024. The following addendum contains information provided by the witnesses that is relevant to Part C of the Commission's Terms of Reference and that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

- Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.

1. Examination by Commission Counsel

1.1 Flow of intelligence related to Michael Chong

- [1] Commission counsel reviewed the intelligence that emerged in 2021 with respect to an effort by the People's Republic of China ("PRC") to gather information about Michael Chong and others who had supported the Uyghur motion, with a view to potentially sanctioning them. Commission counsel then asked the panel why it appeared that serious action, such as the decision to declare a PRC diplomat *persona non grata* ("PNG") and a ministerial directive in respect of briefing Parliamentarians on foreign interference, was taken in 2023 after the media leaks, rather than in 2021 when the intelligence first emerged.
- [2] Mr. Morrison noted certain caveats to the reporting and language used in some of the reporting.

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- [3] Mr. Morrison further explained that all of the reporting highlighted by the Commission describes the possibility of economic sanctions, which are legal. Mr. Morrison testified that imposing economic sanctions is not foreign interference. He described economic sanctions as a key part of every country's diplomatic toolkit. He testified that Global Affairs Canada ("GAC") imposes economic sanctions, and also conducts research on officials from a variety of countries, including the PRC, with a view to applying potential economic sanctions. In particular, GAC has applied sanctions to Chinese officials for their activities in Xinjiang. Mr. Morrison noted that in Canada, GAC must meet a certain threshold using open-source information to apply a sanction, because that decision can be judicially reviewed. He also explained that you are not supposed to apply sanctions to a person's relatives. However, it is not necessarily nefarious for a diplomat to conduct research on the people who were involved in the Uyghur motion.
- [4] Mr. Morrison also explained the "action/reaction" nature of diplomatic sanctions, noting that Chinese officials announced that they were sanctioning Michael Chong and all of the members of the House subcommittee on human rights and foreign relations over the Uyghur motion *after* Canada sanctioned Chinese officials over the PRC's activities in Xinjiang.
- [5] Mr. Rigby testified that he was the NSIA at the time the reporting with respect to Mr. Chong was first circulated. He does not recall reading these reports specifically, but suspects that he did. He explained that, in deciding how to respond to the intelligence, he would have taken into consideration certain caveats to the reporting and the language used in the reporting. He further noted that the language in the reporting is vague. He further testified that gathering information on individual MPs is common practice for diplomatic services and that Canada's diplomats do the same.
- [6] Mr. Rigby was asked whether he asked for more information on the reporting and he testified that he did not. He explained that this issue was not specifically brought to his attention, except that he was copied on the IMU from CSIS informing the Minister that Mr. Chong and another MP would receive a briefing. He may have had a brief conversation with the Director of CSIS about it, but could not specifically recall. It was not elevated to the Deputy Ministers Intelligence Committee for action or otherwise

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flagged as something requiring urgent response. He understood this type of behaviour to be a part of the PRC “playbook.” He noted that earlier, he suggested to the Prime Minister that all MPs be briefed on FI.

- [7] Mr. Rigby believes that seeing these reports, he would have likely thought to keep a watching brief on the issue, to see how it develops. He usually wants an assessment product on that type of reporting. He did not typically bring unassessed intelligence to the Prime Minister. Mr. Rigby explained that at no point during his tenure as NSIA did he receive a particular product in respect of Mr. Chong that demanded immediate action; rather, over time, the issue slowly gathered more momentum. He explained that he would have been alive to the nuances of the language of the report in his assessment of it. He explained that after 30 years in the S&I community, he has learned not to jump to conclusions and push the panic button prematurely.
- [8] On the specific question about why the Chinese diplomat was PNG'd in 2023 and not 2021, Mr. Morrison testified that the Globe and Mail was inaccurate in reporting that the decision to declare the Chinese diplomat PNG in 2023 resulted from the diplomat's actions with respect to Mr. Chong. He explained that, under the Vienna Convention, governments do not need to give a reason to PNG a diplomat, and in this case, a reason for the PNG of the diplomat was not given. People made the assumption that the decision had something to do with Mr. Chong [because of the leaks].
- [9] To the contrary, Mr. Morrison, explained that, by the time GAC decided to PNG the diplomat, GAC had been raising the issue of foreign interference with the Chinese Embassy for two years, approximately 30 times and in four formal diplomatic notes. The decision to expel the diplomat was made in 2023 to express Canadian displeasure with Chinese foreign interference. In response, one of Canada's diplomats was kicked out of China, so it was not a measure that was taken lightly.