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Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference
in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions

Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère
dans les processus électoraux et les
institutions démocratiques fédérales

Addendum to Interview Summary: Vincent Rigby, David Morrison, Michael MacDonald, Martin Green Interview Summary

Vincent Rigby, David Morrison, Michael MacDonald, and Martin Green were interviewed in a panel format by Commission Counsel on February 16, 2024. The interview was held in a secure environment and included references to classified information. This addendum contains information provided during that interview that is relevant to Stage 2 of the Commission's proceedings and that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

- Text contained [in square brackets] are explanatory notes provided by Commission counsels to assist the reader.

1. Michael Chong

- [1] The witnesses were referred to a 2021 CSIS product describing the PRC's interest in certain Members of Parliament, including the Honourable Michael Chong.
- [2] Mr. Morrison noted that he is familiar with this CSIS product, although not necessarily from the time as he was not NSIA. Mr. Rigby noted certain caveats to the reporting and the language used in the reporting. He stated that a CSIS product like this one would not necessarily set off alarm bells.
- [3] The witnesses were then referred to another 2021 CSIS product that provides further information about PRC activity related to Michael Chong. They were also referred to another 2021 CSIS product that discusses PRC efforts to influence Parliament's Uyghur genocide motion and includes a reference to the activity directed towards ethnic

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Chinese MPs who voted in support of the motion, naming Mr. Chong in that regard. Mr. Morrison and Mr. Rigby could not recall whether they had seen these documents.

- [4] Then, the witnesses were referred to an Intelligence Assessment on PRC FI in Canada, dated July 20, 2021, and was the subject of reporting in Canadian news media. On p. 5, the first bullet discusses, without naming Mr. Chong, the PRC activity directed at Mr. Chong following his involvement in the House of Commons vote on the Uyghur genocide. Upon reviewing the totality of the documents containing direct or indirect reference to Mr. Chong, Commission counsel asked the interviewees who was “tracking the issue” at PCO. Commission counsel also put the proposition to the interviewees that despite the IA not using Mr. Chong’s name, it should have been clear that it referred to Mr. Chong.
- [5] Mr. Morrison stated it was not apparent to him that the IA referred to Mr. Chong. He explained that, because he was not NSIA at the time certain related CSIS products came in, he was not focused on domestic intelligence. Mr. Morrison further explained that IAs are broader-based assessment products and that the specific examples in them are not necessarily intended for immediate action. He explained that, as set out in the second paragraph on page 2 of the document, the document was intended to provide the reader with a baseline understanding of the subject matter of the assessment. He further understood the bullet on p. 5 referred to by Commission counsel to have been included as an illustrative example, and not for action.
- [6] Mr. Morrison provided further clarity on this IA after the interview was complete. Mr. Morrison explained that there would have been no reason for him to connect the July 2021 IA to the earlier CSIS reporting referenced by the Commission. Mr. Morrison explained that when a piece of intelligence comes in that is especially important, time-sensitive, and actionable, it becomes the primary topic of conversation among officials in the intelligence community. It would be the subject of multiple conversations and *ad hoc* meetings, and most likely would be discussed at DM Committee meetings to consider options to address the issue. Mr. Morrison recalled that none of this happened in respect of the Michael Chong intelligence. This was consistent with the fact that intelligence requiring immediate action does not normally come in an IA. Mr. Morrison

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explained that neither he, nor anyone else at PCO was “tracking the issue”, as suggested by Commission counsel, because CSIS had already taken action according to the protocols in place at the time.

- [7] Mr. Rigby advised that he was not in the NSIA role at the time, and could not comment on this IA, but provided further clarity after the interview on responding to intelligence generally. Mr. Rigby explained that officials will often wait to see if subsequent intelligence contains corroborating information that builds the case for action slowly over time. This is especially the case for FI, which is insidious and develops slowly over time.
- [8] Mr. MacDonald added that he would not have connected this IA to the earlier CSIS reporting on Mr. Chong that was referenced by the Commission. He noted he did not remember reading this particular reporting, but would have remembered the names of specific MPs. He noted he has no records of receiving these documents.
- [9] Mr. Green noted that he had seen FI discussed in intelligence reports from the intelligence community before 2021.
- [10] Mr. Rigby added that the NSIA reads thousands of documents each year and that he relied on agencies to flag important information for attention, noting that PCO is not a first line of defence. He does not recall the issue being brought to Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Operational Coordination (DMOC).